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 Overview 
 
Persistent double-digit annual increases in prescription drug costs have generated considerable 
interest in strategies to control growth in drug spending.  As the recent Medicare prescription 
drug debate demonstrated, there are numerous options available to public and private actors 
interested in moderating drug prices, although deep divisions exist within the policy community 
and the public over the appropriate roles for and balance between market forces and government 
regulation.  This report was developed to assist policy makers and others in understanding better 
the various options available to address drug spending growth and how private and public payers 
are currently using these options in different settings. 
 
Concern over rapidly rising drug prices is likely to continue for some time to come – actuaries at 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services project that prescription drug spending will rise 
on average by more than 10 percent per year over the next decade, faster than any other health 
care service and far outstripping growth in inflation.  Both public and private policy makers are 
striving to find strategies that will work to slow drug spending growth.  In doing so, they hope to 
move beyond anecdotal evidence or a belief that a particular cost-containment strategy will save 
money to finding systematic evidence on the use of a strategy.  The research underlying this 
report suggests that a limited literature is available on the range of cost-containment strategies, 
but that literature is hardly adequate to make choices for the many different settings through 
which Americans get their drug benefits.  The challenge remaining for both the research and 
policy communities is to sponsor and conduct more studies on the effectiveness of cost-
containment strategies. 
 
 
How To Use This Report 
 
This report provides detailed descriptions of over 30 specific cost control strategies, organized 
under three broad themes.  The first, “Utilization Strategies,” describes a variety of market-based 
approaches intended to affect which and how many drugs patients use.  These strategies range 
from direct limits (such as excluding specific drugs from coverage or limiting the quantity 
covered), to rules on utilization (such as formularies, preferred drug lists, step therapy, and prior 
authorization requirements), to methods to influence how much the patients pays (such as tiered 
copayments or reference pricing).  The second, “Pricing Strategies,” discusses market-based 
approaches intended to reduce the price of drugs, including restricted pharmacy networks, use of 
mail-order pharmacy, and manufacturer rebates.  A final theme, “Regulatory Strategies,” 
discusses ways of using government authority to contain costs, including direct price regulation, 
changing patent-protection laws, and transferring drugs to over-the-counter status. 
 
The report looks at each cost-containment strategy separately, with a description of how the 
approach works, examples of how the approach is being used by private or public payers, and, 
when available, a discussion of known evidence (with citations to relevant literature) regarding 
the effectiveness or cost-savings potential of the approach.  These descriptions are independent 
from one another; readers are free to look at just a few approaches that are of interest or may 
wish to review the entire document for a thorough review of cost-containment options. 
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The information presented here was obtained through a literature review performed by the 
author, with the help of two research assistants, between mid-2002 and mid-2004.  A fuller 
discussion of the methodology is presented in Appendix A.  Readers should note that the 
evidence relating to cost-effectiveness in particular has important limitations.  There are 
relatively few peer-reviewed studies looking at the impact of different cost-containment 
strategies.  Several approaches, such as tiered cost sharing, have been the subject of a number of 
studies, but many other strategies have not been studied extensively.  In some cases, evidence of 
effectiveness has been reported – often in quite general terms – in various industry newsletters or 
in reports produced by different industry organizations (e.g., the large pharmacy benefit 
managers). In the discussions below, we label carefully the source of the available evidence.  
Although peer-reviewed studies are clearly preferable, decision-makers can make cautious use of 
other evidence.  Readers should draw their own conclusions about how much weight to give to 
the non-peer-reviewed evidence.  Additional discussion of the use of evidence from the literature 
is included in Appendix A. 
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 1. Utilization Strategies: Direct Limits  
 
These strategies limit utilization directly.  Some strategies, such as limiting the maximum 
number of prescriptions per month, are applied without regard to the circumstances of specific 
patients or specific providers.  These decisions may be subject to an exceptions or appeals 
process, but otherwise patients who wish to receive the limited drug generally pay the entire cost 
out of pocket.  Other strategies may restrict coverage because of patient-specific factors.  The 
latter often relate to patient safety factors, such as avoiding adverse drug reactions or drugs that 
are inappropriate for patients of a certain age. 
 
a. Exclusion of specific drugs or drug classes from coverage 
b. Exclusion of over-the-counter drugs from coverage 
c. Dispensing limits (quantity limits) for a particular drug or prescription 
d. General limits or caps on the quantity of drugs covered 
e. Concurrent (prospective) drug utilization review 
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1a. Exclusion of Specific Drugs or Drug Classes from Coverage 
 
Plan sponsors may choose to exclude certain drugs or classes of drugs from coverage.  Often, 
these exclusions represent a design decision of what types of services plan sponsors want in their 
health plan.  Thus, they may exclude weight loss products, birth control pills, or life-style drugs.  
These exclusions of course reduce the overall cost of a drug benefit.  One Pharmacy Benefit 
Manager (PBM) advises its clients that all the typical classes of drugs excluded collectively 
represent about 5 percent of all drug costs (Medco).  However, only about one-fourth of its 
clients totally exclude oral contraceptives and vitamins, the two largest classes among those that 
are sometimes excluded.  The PBM advises clients that a typical set of exclusions may yield 
savings in the range of 1 percent of drug costs.  In at least some cases, plan members may 
purchase excluded drugs at the plan’s discount, and the plan will conduct checks for health and 
safety considerations. 
 
One consultant suggests that Medicare might consider excluding various classes of drugs (Fox).  
“Quality of life” drugs such as those preventing or reversing hair loss or topical drugs that 
promise to result in clearer skin do not improve medical outcomes or reduce overall health costs.  
Policies affecting some drugs in this category become complicated, especially because benefit 
designs are not always carefully drawn, resulting in coverage of new drugs that they really did 
not intend to cover.  For example, when Viagra was introduced to treat erectile dysfunction, it 
did not fall in an excluded class for many plans.  Plans wishing to exclude it from coverage had 
to revise their benefit design at the next opportunity.  Nonsedating antihistamines for allergies 
may be viewed by some as improving quality of life, but not medical outcomes – but may be 
especially important for a worker who operates complex machinery.  Fox also suggests that some 
drugs that are expensive and marginally effective or whose indications for use are unclear could 
be candidates for exclusion from coverage.  Alternatively, coverage could be limited to 
individuals with specific health problems (e.g., Cox-2 inhibitors could be made available only to 
people with documented gastrointestinal problems). 
 
Medicaid by statute allows states to exclude coverage for several classes of drugs: drugs for 
anorexia, weight loss, or weight gain; infertility treatments; drugs for cosmetic purposes or hair 
growth; drugs for symptomatic relief of cough and colds; smoking cessation products; vitamins 
and minerals; nonprescription drugs; barbiturates; and benzodiazepines.  In practice some states 
choose not to take advantage of these exclusions.  While a majority of states, according to the 
December 2003 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured survey, excluded certain 
classes (cosmetic, hair-loss drugs, fertility or sexual dysfunction drugs, and weight-control 
drugs), a smaller number of states chose to exclude smoking cessation drugs (Crowley et al.).  
The Medicare Modernization Act generally follows the Medicaid statutory exclusions as 
opposed to actual state practices, but it does require coverage of smoking cessation drugs. 
 
In the private sector, according to a 2002 survey, 72 percent of employers were excluding drugs 
for weight loss, 57 percent excluded smoking cessation drugs, 51 percent excluded fertility 
treatments from coverage, while a considerably smaller number excluded such classes as growth 
hormones or oral contraceptives (PBMI).  The proportion of employers excluding injectable 
drugs and oral contraceptives has been dropping modestly since 2000.  Instead, some previously 
excluded drugs are now covered but placed in a coverage tier with a substantial copayment or are 
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covered only under prior authorization or as part of some other type of utilization management 
program.  In still other cases, drugs might be covered only for certain categories of patients (e.g., 
growth hormones where there is documentation that a child has a medical syndrome causing him 
or her to grow too slowly) or in conjunction with certain programs (e.g., appetite suppressants for 
a patient who meets with a nutritionist on a regular basis). 
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1b. Exclusion of Over-the-Counter Drugs from Coverage 
 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) designates when a drug can be dispensed only with a 
prescription.  In other cases, drugs can be dispensed over-the-counter (OTC) without a 
prescription.  Health plans may choose not to cover OTC drugs or to cover them in only limited 
circumstances.  Nearly all private employers (95 percent) completely exclude OTC drugs from 
coverage, although the recent move of some highly used drugs to OTC status is creating 
exceptions to this general policy (PBMI/2003).  Otherwise, the exceptions were firms that 
provided coverage of certain products (e.g., aspirin or ibuprofen) either as part of a disease 
management program or as the first level in step therapy.  For example, one New York managed 
health plan covered nonprescription H2 antagonists (Tagamet HB, Pepcid AC, Zantac 175).  The 
article reporting this cited the plan’s claim of a nearly 50 percent reduction in its budget for 
prescription versions.  The plan had not yet reviewed whether there was any change in use of 
more expensive brand-name drugs like Prevacid (Sica). 
 
State Medicaid programs are somewhat more likely to cover OTC drugs than are private firms, 
but states vary substantially.  In 2003, 39 of 43 responding states reporting covering at least some 
OTC drugs.  Some states cover all OTC drugs, while others cover them only in certain 
circumstances.  For example, Washington covers OTC drugs when they are less costly than the 
competing prescription drug, while Illinois requires that a prescription be obtained for the OTC 
drug (Crowley et al.).  According to a 2001 survey, classes of OTC drugs most commonly 
covered were cough/cold medications and diabetic supplies.  Least commonly covered were 
smoking cessation drugs, contraceptives, and feminine products (Schwalberg et al.). 
 
The FDA’s decision in 2002 to allow the sale of Claritin on an OTC basis has brought attention 
to this issue.  According to news accounts, some insurance companies responded by making it 
difficult for patients to obtain competing prescriptions once a drug in its class becomes available 
over-the-counter.  Some large insurers responded to this change by moving competing drugs 
(Allegra and Zyrtec) to non-formulary status, requiring patients to get prior authorization before 
getting these drugs covered.  Where closed formularies are in use, Allegra and Zyrtec will 
require prior authorization; where open formularies are used, prescriptions for the alternatives to 
Claritin are covered at the highest copay level.  In other cases, insurers require proof that a 
patient has tried Claritin before allowing a person to receive coverage for a competing drug. 
 
One news account reported Medco’s estimate that its clients could save over $500 million (about 
40 percent of the total amount spent on non-sedating antihistamines in 2002) in the first year of 
Claritin’s availability as an OTC drug, often as a result of dropping coverage for competing 
drugs.  Presumably some of this savings will be a cost shift to patients who will pay the full cost 
of Claritin out of pocket.  As generic alternatives to Claritin become more widely available, the 
new costs to patients may become less. 
 
The FDA decided in June 2003 to approve over-the-counter sales of another popular prescription 
medication, Prilosec – a proton pump inhibitor (PPI) for certain gastrointestinal problems.  One 
health plan decided to cover Prilosec OTC since it has the same active ingredient and dose as 
generic Prilosec by prescription, but with a large cost difference.  The plan noted that Prilosec 
OTC cost less than $1 per tablet, compared to $3 for generic Prilosec, and chose to cover it on 
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that basis as long as it is prescribed by a doctor.  In doing so, the plan did not modify its general 
rule against covering OTC medications, arguing that the Prilosec situation is unique.  Other plans 
did not immediately change their rules, but considered higher cost sharing or additional prior 
authorization requirements for competing drugs in the same class. 
 
A 2003 survey found evidence of some overall change in plan sponsors’ attitudes toward 
coverage of OTC drugs.  About 10 percent of plans were covering OTC Claritin, while 12 
percent of plans were excluding other non-sedating antihistamines from coverage.  About 4 
percent of plans were covering OTC Prilosec.  The lower coverage level in this case may have 
reflected both the more recent date of the move to OTC status for Prilosec and the fact that 
stronger doses of Prilosec remained available by prescription (PBMI/2004). 
 
One published study looked at the decision of a state employee health plan to add coverage for 
Prilosec OTC.  It found that within two months, about 60 percent of claims for drugs in the PPI 
class were for Prilosec OTC.  The state realized savings of as much as 50 percent of total costs 
for the PPI class, despite a modest increase in the use of such drugs.  Plan enrollees also realized 
savings based on lower copayments, and savings may increase beyond the scope of this short-
term study if more enrollees switch away from prescription products (Harris et al.). 
 
Cost tradeoffs can sometimes create a rationale for covering an OTC drug.  If a plan covers 
prescription pain medications, but does not cover aspirin or ibuprofen, it is more difficult for the 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) to recommend substitution of the nonprescription medication.  
In some cases (e.g., aspirin), the total cost might be lower than the copayment on an expensive 
alternative like a Cox-2 inhibitor.  But in cases like Claritin, the cost of the OTC drug is 
considerably higher; in fact, it may be cheaper for a person to spend a $10 copayment on a 
competing drug than to spend $1 per pill on OTC Claritin (Neergard).  A peer-reviewed study in 
1995 showed that people with prescription coverage are more likely to choose prescription 
medications over OTC alternatives when the price of the OTC drug is greater than the after-
insurance cost of the more expensive prescription medication (Stuart and Grana). 
 
There do not appear to be any studies of how well coverage of OTC drugs by Medicaid has 
worked.  Where OTC drugs are covered, it increases the cost to the state.  Where OTC drugs are 
not covered and a drug like Claritin is shifted to OTC status, it will either increase costs to 
beneficiaries or deny access to those drugs for reasons of affordability.   
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1c.  Dispensing Limits (Quantity Limits) for a Particular Drug or Prescription 
 
Some health plans make specific provisions to establish how much of a drug is covered by 
limiting the quantity of pills or the number of days a prescription may cover.  For example, a 
plan might limit the plan member to a certain number of migraine medications per month.  Some 
groups refer to this as managed drug limitation.  One issue is that a month’s supply of some 
drugs is not well defined and depends on patient circumstances.  A migraine medication that is 
used “as needed” for migraine headaches may be required just once or twice a month for some 
patients and a dozen or more times for others.  One variation on quantity limits is a trial 
prescription program, where the prescription is dispensed in two parts – a seven-day supply and 
then the balance, after a follow-up phone call to assess side effects and compliance.   
 
Under Medicaid, nearly all states have some type of limit on prescriptions.  The most common is 
a limit on the amount of medication per prescription (e.g., 30 days, 34 days, or 100 units).  Some 
states also limit the number of refills, for example, to 4 within 6 months (Crowley et al.).  
 
One PBM, Medco Health, states in its Drug Trend Report that plan exclusions — including both 
specific drug limits and general limitations (section 1d) — can save up to 1 percent of drug 
spending.  Medco asserts that large savings are available in certain cases, citing that limits on a 
medication for severe acute pain (Toradol) yielded a 45 percent reduction in claims 
(Medco/2002; Medco/2004). 
 
A 2001 peer-reviewed study looked at whether the length of a prescription could be a factor in 
increasing drug costs (Walton et al.).  The study looked at the potential for drug wastage when 
physicians make changes to patients’ prescriptions while the patient still has a supply of the 
medication.  According to the study, about three-fourths of the prescriptions studied (in a VA 
system) were for 90 days, with the rest for 30 days, and about 15 percent of each type were 
changed during the term of the prescription.  The researchers found that the total unnecessary 
cost for unneeded drugs was lower for the 90-day prescriptions, with the additional dispensing 
costs outweighing the greater amount of medication wasted.  The authors acknowledge 
numerous limitations on the study, but suggest that their model can be used in other situations. 
 
Two peer-reviewed studies looked at the effect of monthly coverage limits on migraine 
medications (triptans such as Imitrex).  One examined a provision by a managed-care plan that 
limited coverage to dosages appropriate for four migraines per month.  If a patient exceeded the 
quantity limit, the prescription was denied pending an appeal to the plan.  Looking at utilization 
before and after the limit was imposed, the researchers found that the plan saved money – based 
on a decrease in the use of these medications.  They found that there was an increase in the 
number of patients taking prophylactic therapy, and small changes in utilization of 
hospitalizations and physician visits.  The overall level of cost savings, according to the study, 
was $12.25 per member per month (Culley and Wanovich).   
 
The measure analyzed in the second paper included a monthly milligram limit without allowing 
for medical exceptions or system overrides.  The program resulted in a 29 percent reduction in 
direct drug costs and a 40 percent decline in related medical services.  There was no 
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accompanying increase in any other medication category, although changes in use of over-the-
counter medications were not studied (Hoffman et al.). 
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1d. General Limits or Caps on the Quantity of Drugs Covered 
 
One of the simplest means to control costs is to limit the amount of drugs for which payment is 
provided by the health plan.  This strategy may take the form of a quarterly or annual limit on the 
amount of coverage.  Thus, a benefit may cover up to $300 worth of covered drugs per quarter or 
$1,000 per year.  Alternatively, this strategy may take the form of a limit on the number of 
prescriptions covered, such as no more than five prescriptions per month.  These provisions may 
have a large effect in limiting a plan’s or payer’s costs, but may have less effect on overall drug 
costs and almost certainly will raise the costs to consumers.  When enrollees exceed the cap, they 
may still have access to the plan’s discounted retail prices, although paying the entire cost out of 
pocket.  But availability of discounted prices varies by the specific arrangements made by plans, 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), and pharmacies. 
 
One issue where caps or other quantity limits are used is how spending is counted to determine 
whether the limit is reached.  Typically, plans calculate expenditures based on the negotiated 
contract prices at the retail pharmacy, less the enrollee’s copayment.  But this contract price does 
not factor in manufacturer rebates, although these may help to lower overall plan premiums.  
Another issue is that claims data may no longer be accumulated after a cap is reached, especially 
if the enrollee does not present the insurance card or goes to a non-network pharmacy.  In the 
absence of claims data, utilization review functions cannot be performed. 
 
General quantity limits are not a popular cost containment approach in the private market.  One 
PBM, Medco Health, notes that general annual benefit maximums or caps are “among the less 
desirable ways to share costs with members.”  While these limits can provide a quick fix to lower 
drug spending, the PBM indicates that it penalizes plan members who are the sickest and most in 
need of medications.  The result may be that these members skip essential medications and incur 
higher overall medical costs (Medco).  
 
Although quantity limits or caps seem unpopular with private purchasers, they are far more 
common with public purchasers.  In Medicaid, a growing number of state plans have limits on 
the number of refills per prescription and the number of prescriptions a beneficiary can have at 
one time before the state requires prior authorization (Crowley et al.).  In addition, quantity limits 
have become increasingly popular is Medicare+Choice.  In 2003, only 2 percent of plans, 
weighted by enrollment, had unlimited coverage for both brand and generic drugs – down from 
22 percent in 1999.  Among enrollees with some drug coverage, about 41 percent had coverage 
only for generic drugs.  When coverage is available for both generic and brand-name drugs, 
about 63 percent faced a cap of $1,000 or less per year (Achman and Gold).  The increased use 
of $500 or $1,000 annual caps means that many beneficiaries reach them each year.  There is 
also an increase in the use of semi-annual, quarterly, or even monthly limits (Draper et al.). 
 
The impact of quantity limits has been considered in several peer-reviewed studies.  Stephen 
Soumerai and his colleagues have conducted a series of studies looking at the impact of monthly 
limits on prescriptions as imposed by state Medicaid programs.  In particular, studies focused on 
a three-prescription monthly limit posed by New Hampshire in 1981 before switching to a 
copayment in 1982.  New Jersey Medicaid was used as a comparison state.  Soumerai and his 
colleagues found a sustained reduction in the number of prescriptions filled after the cap was 
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imposed.  The reductions occurred both for essential and less essential drugs, but the drops were 
lesser for essential drugs and for relatively high-cost drugs.  The overall result, according to the 
study, was a 19 percent reduction in spending for the state, but at the expense of reduced use of 
appropriate medications (Soumerai et al. 1987).  A second study showed that the reduced drug 
use resulted in increased nursing home admissions (Soumerai et al. 1991), and a third study 
showed resulting increases in visits to community mental health centers and sharp increases in 
the use of emergency mental health services and partial hospitalization (although no increase in 
hospital admissions) for patients with schizophrenia (Soumerai et al. 1994).  A closer look at 
chronically ill patients showed an average 34 percent drop in the use of essential medications 
(Fortess et al.). 
 
Other peer-reviewed studies have looked at the effect of capped benefits in Medicare+Choice.  
One study by a researcher at a managed health plan found that from 17 percent to 25 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries exhausted their capped benefits in 1998, well before the substantial 
growth in the use of capped benefits by plans (Rector).  In these cases, beneficiaries were more 
likely to disenroll from the plan, with potential consequences for continuity of care.  Another 
study by researchers at a PBM found that beneficiaries at risk for reaching their prescription cap 
take various steps to reduce costs (Cox et al.).  Some steps, such as getting samples from 
physicians, might be considered prudent behaviors, while others, such as discontinuing 
prescribed drugs or taking less than prescribed, might place the patient at risk.   
 
Another peer-reviewed study looking at 2001 claims of Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and 
older with high medication costs and enrolled in a Medicare+Choice plan that imposed annual 
dollar limits found that as many as 22 percent of beneficiaries exceeded the caps with resulting 
higher out-of-pocket costs (Tseng et al. 2003).  A further study by the same researchers found 
that 18 percent of patients exceeding these caps used less prescribed medication than Medicare 
beneficiaries in a control group (10 percent).  While 8 percent of both groups of beneficiaries 
stopped taking their prescribed medications altogether, those exceeding the cap were more likely 
to call pharmacies to find the best price for their drug (46 percent versus 29 percent), switch 
medications (15 percent versus 9 percent), and use samples (34 percent versus 27 percent).  
Sixty-two percent of those who exceeded their plan’s cap had difficulty paying for prescriptions 
compared with 37 percent of beneficiaries in the control group (Tseng et al. 2004). 
 
Another peer-reviewed study surveyed beneficiaries with chronic illnesses who enrolled in eight 
Medicare+Choice plans with a capped drug benefit.  About one-third of enrollees reported not 
filling a prescription or reducing the prescribed dosage because of their out-of-pocket costs.  The 
result was under-use of needed medications, especially for those with lower incomes or poorer 
health (Rector and Venus). 
 
A somewhat different angle on the latter question was addressed in a peer-reviewed study of how 
Medicare beneficiaries chose among capped and uncapped drug benefit plans.  It found that 
beneficiaries choosing the capped plans were less likely to have high expenses, suggesting that 
they anticipated their needs correctly before choosing a plan (Andrade and Gurwitz). 
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1e.  Concurrent (Prospective) Drug Utilization Review 
 
Concurrent or prospective drug utilization review (DUR) strategies (sometimes referred to as 
point-of-sale DUR) restrict filling a prescription based on factors such as duplication, 
interactions with other drugs, excessive dosage or duration, or diagnostic appropriateness.  
Unlike other types of utilization review that may look at overall patterns of utilization (sections 
4a, 4c), concurrent DUR focuses on the particular prescription that has been presented.  It may 
look at whether the patient has a current prescription for the same drug or another drug for the 
same condition.  It may also look at factors that could adversely affect the patient’s health, such 
as interactions with other prescribed drugs, whether the dosage or duration of the prescription is 
greater than recommended guidelines, or whether a particular drug is contraindicated based on 
the patient’s age, sex, or other characteristics.  Concurrent DUR typically generates a flag for the 
pharmacist, who can override the flag either based on his or her own assessment or after 
consultation with the prescribing physician. 
 
One pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) for example, AdvancePCS, applies several types of 
reviews to new prescriptions: (1) drug-drug interaction, (2) drug-age conflict, identifying drugs 
that should be used with caution based on the age of the patient, (3) drug-disease conflict, (4) 
drug-allergy conflict, for drugs to which a patient may have sensitivities, (5) drug-gender issue, 
(6) drug-pregnancy warning, for drugs that should be avoided during pregnancy, (7) excessive 
controlled substance utilization, (8) overuse or excessive duration of a prescription, (9) high dose 
warning, (10) ingredient duplication, and (11) therapeutic duplication.  In 2001, AdvancePCS 
reported issuing safety-related alerts on 7 percent of all claims.  High dose warnings and drug-
drug interactions were the alerts that occurred most commonly.  Nearly 10 percent of those alerts 
resulted in a changed prescription.  Ingredient or therapeutic duplication and high dose warnings 
were the alerts that were most likely to lead to the “reversal” of a prescription.  Between 20 
percent and 25 percent of the reversals in certain categories occurred based on prescriptions 
filled at different pharmacies – a situation that could not be observed and corrected by the 
pharmacist at a single pharmacy (AdvancePCS). 
 
Concurrent DUR is one of the more universal cost containment approaches, being increasingly 
regarded as a basic element of electronic claims processing.  It is used by a substantial majority 
of private plans, and all state Medicaid programs by law are required to have DUR programs for 
outpatient drugs.  According to a 2002 survey, 81 percent of private employers reported that their 
plans have implemented concurrent DUR programs (PBMI/2003).  Nearly all states use 
automated DUR systems and contract with outside agencies to run these systems.  Some states 
use active systems where the review agency must intervene to override an alert; others use 
passive systems that provide the information to the pharmacist, but do not prevent the 
prescription from being dispensed (Crowley et al.). 
 
Two peer-reviewed studies looked at the response of physicians and pharmacists to concurrent 
DUR alerts.  One, conducted by researchers at a large PBM examined 43,000 alerts triggered by 
their DUR program in one year.  In over half of these alerts, the PBM was able to contact a 
physician and saw a change to a more appropriate drug in one-fourth of those cases (Monane et 
al.).  The other study found that pharmacists did not intervene for all DUR messages, but they 
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found those related to medication overuse and drug interactions most useful.  The most common 
response was to telephone physicians or talk to patients (Armstrong and Markson). 
 
Another study focused on the introduction of prospective DUR in Medicaid and found no 
evidence that the DUR programs had any measurable effect on reducing the frequency of drug 
problems, or on lowering spending or utilization of either drugs or other health services.  Despite 
these results, the evaluators do not conclude that the DUR programs are wasted efforts, but raise 
the possibility that the particular DUR models studied may not have been the most promising 
(Kidder and Bae).  A 2004 review article reports that a growing body of literature indicates 
numerous problems with respect to the quality of DUR criteria and alerts and the response of 
health care professionals to these alerts.  Problems ranged from technical issues (e.g., duplicate 
messaging from in-store and on-line systems) to those involving how pharmacists interpret and 
respond to the alerts.  The article included recommendations on both sets of issues, including 
more validation of criteria through evidence-based studies, performance standards for 
pharmacists, and payment to pharmacists for time spent identifying and addressing drug therapy 
problems (Fulda et al.). 
 
Two case studies also indicate the types of savings that purchasers might expect for the use of 
concurrent DUR.  In one case study of the use of utilization management by a medium-sized 
company, concurrent DUR was used to look for potentially inappropriate drug use, such as use 
of products containing aspirin for patients with ulcers, use of certain anti-depressants for patients 
with Parkinson’s disease, and certain combination cholesterol therapies that can have unwanted 
side effects.  When these situations were flagged, two clinical pharmacists reviewed case 
histories and where appropriate recommended a change in therapy to the prescribing physician.  
The company estimated that it was able to reduce its overall drug spending for the year by 2.3 
percent compared to what it would have spent otherwise (PBMI/2002). 
 
Another case study involved reviews for duplicative therapies for a municipality with 17,000 
covered lives.  Interventions were triggered in cases where different drugs with an identical or 
similar therapeutic profile were prescribed within the same 30-day period.  Therapeutic classes 
that received particular attention were anti-depressants, anti-histamines, nasal sprays, non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, and proton pump inhibitors.  In an eight-month period, 
duplicate prescriptions were identified for 105 patients, generating an estimated savings of 
$8,810 (PBMI/2002). 
 
Finally, another peer-reviewed study showed the potential represented for savings if the 
inappropriate use of drugs by older people were reduced.  The study found that about 20 percent 
of patients (seniors living in the community) used one or more drugs considered inappropriate.  
This inappropriate use persisted over time (Hanlon et al.). 
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 2. Utilization Strategies: Utilization Management Approaches 
 
These utilization management approaches are focused on particular prescription events.  While 
reviews may be triggered at the point of sale, they generally require some type of interaction 
with the physician.  Unlike direct limits (section 1), these utilization strategies are mostly aimed 
at substituting a different drug for that originally prescribed.  Patients who prefer the originally 
prescribed drug may be required to pay some or all of the cost out of pocket, to apply for an 
exception, or to file a formal appeal.  Cost sharing approaches (listed as a separate category, 
section 3) are often used as an incentive mechanism in conjunction with utilization management 
approaches. 
 
a. Prior authorization requirements 
b. Step therapy or fail-first requirements 
c. Therapeutic substitution or therapeutic intervention 
d. Closed formulary 
e. Preferred drug list or open formulary 
f. Mandatory generic substitution 
g. Management of specialty drugs  
h. Provider financial incentives 
i. Payments to pharmacies as incentives  
j. Other coverage management approaches 
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2a.  Prior Authorization Requirements 
 
Under prior authorization, the health plan or pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) must authorize a 
particular prescription before it can be filled.  Prior authorization may be required for drugs in 
certain classes in order to limit use of drugs in that class to patients with certain medical 
conditions or histories.  In other cases, this strategy is used as a means of enforcing a formulary 
or preferred drug list (section 2e).  Drugs off the formulary or preferred list might be available 
with prior authorization in contrast to a formulary that is enforced by incentives such as different 
levels of copayments.  Prior authorization also may be used in conjunction with a step therapy 
system (section 2b), so that a patient might be required to try a less expensive drug before 
receiving authorization to receive the drug originally requested.   
 
Prior authorization is used by about three-fourths of private employers (PBMI).  One PBM 
(Medco Health) suggests that savings are accomplished more easily and more effectively when 
prior authorization programs are applied at the time when a drug is first introduced rather than 
later, after patient prescribing patterns have been established. 
 
Most state Medicaid programs also make at least some use of prior authorization, typically 
targeting certain classes of drugs (e.g., growth hormones, impotence agents, and anorexia drugs).  
States may also require prior authorization for more common medications, such as non-steroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) or anti-ulcer medications.  By law states that include a prior 
authorization for their Medicaid programs must have a process for responding within 24 hours to 
authorization requests and must provide a 72-hour emergency supply of any drug on the prior 
authorization list (Crowley et al.).  More recently, several states (e.g., Michigan) have created 
preferred drug lists that use prior authorization as a means of enforcing the list. 
 
In April 2004, a federal appeals court rejected a challenge by the pharmaceutical industry that 
Michigan’s use of prior authorization for drugs not on preferred drug lists forced patients to 
accept inferior drug alternatives.  The court’s decision stated that “... the available data 
confirmed that in practice the prior authorization requirement has proved neither burdensome nor 
overly time-consuming” (Pear). 
 
Some state Medicaid programs have relatively simple prior authorization processes.  According 
to a 2003 study on prior authorization requirements for five state Medicaid programs, Georgia 
requires prior authorization for 25 categories of drugs and contracts with a PBM to conduct the 
reviews.  Physicians must document medical necessity in order to get the drug authorized.  
Pharmacists can override the authorization requirement.  By contrast, Washington state has a 
complicated system that combines prior authorization for certain drugs with another type of 
review for beneficiaries that are prescribed at least four brand-name prescriptions in a month or 
are prescribed non-preferred drugs in any of certain therapeutic classes.  The biggest complaints 
raised about the use of prior authorization included delays in getting needed prescriptions, 
multiple trips to the doctor or to the pharmacy, insufficient information for beneficiaries about 
the process (e.g., appeal rights), and administrative burden for doctors.  Oklahoma includes in its 
procedure a random call back to people who have been denied a prescribed drug; the state found 
no adverse outcomes (Tilly and Elam). 
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A 2001 literature review of studies of prior authorization found six studies that looked at the 
effects of a prior authorization program on specified drugs.  The authors found generally that the 
studies lacked a randomized, controlled design and had severe methodological flaws.  The 
studies concluded that prior authorization programs had an impact on reducing costs, but 
generally they did not examine the impact on outcomes or satisfaction (MacKinnon and Kumar). 
 
Among the peer-reviewed studies considered for that review was a 1995 paper that looked at a 
prior-authorization policy for non-generic NSAIDs in the Tennessee Medicaid program (Smalley 
et al.).  Overall, expenditures for NSAIDs fell by 53 percent, as a result of increased use of 
generic NSAIDs and a decrease in overall NSAID use.  The authors found no accompanying 
increase in other medical expenditures.  Another paper looked at the use of prior authorization in 
Georgia, finding savings of $8 to $20 million annually across all 46 drugs in the program 
(Kotzan et al. 1996).  The same research team earlier reported on savings specific to the use of 
NSAIDs (Kotzan et al. 1993). 
 
A 2001 peer-reviewed study by PBM researchers (at AdvancePCS) looked at strategies for 
managing Cox-2 drugs (Celebrex, in particular), comparing four different approaches used by 
different client companies (Tucker et al.).  The study showed that prior authorization was the 
second most effective of the four (in terms of percentage savings).  The other utilization 
management approaches tested were step therapy (most effective), a form of reference pricing 
(third), and three-tier copayments (least effective).  In another study published in the Journal of 
Managed Care Pharmacy, prior authorization for Cox-2 inhibitors in a 3-tier copay plan proved 
effective in managing pharmacy costs (Stacy et al.).  This concurs with an Express Scripts 
presentation (not peer reviewed), which asserts that drug expenditures were significantly lower 
under prior authorization for nearly all therapy classes studied.  The cost savings may be 
associated with significantly lower utilization for the drug classes studied (Motheral et al.). 
 
Finally, another peer-reviewed study used 2001 drug claims data from a national PBM to look at 
the effect of various plan design features on drug use and spending for people age 65 and older 
with private employer-based coverage.  Prior authorization programs were categorized based on 
how frequently they deny prescriptions.  Savings were shown for plans with stronger prior 
authorization controls for certain drug classes (anti-obesity drugs, blood products, and central 
nervous system drugs).  Prior authorization is generally used in combination with other 
strategies, and the study was not able to examine its effect alone (Thomas et al.). 
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2b.  Step Therapy or Fail-First Requirements 
 
Step therapy, also referred to as a fail-first requirement, is a program where payment for a drug is 
restricted unless certain other drug therapies have been tried first.  For example, coverage of 
Cox-2 inhibitors (e.g., Celebrex) for arthritis would be available only to patients who do not 
respond successfully to less costly non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs).  Thus a 
patient might first be treated with a non-prescription NSAID like ibuprofen.  If that treatment is 
not satisfactory, coverage for a prescription dose of ibuprofen might be approved, followed by a 
drug like naproxen sodium.  Only if those drugs have been tried and deemed unsuccessful would 
coverage be approved for a Cox-2 inhibitor.  These programs are sometimes referred to as fail-
first requirements since a certain drug (e.g., Cox-2 inhibitor) cannot be prescribed until other 
therapies have been tried first and failed. 
 
According to private-sector employer surveys, step therapy was used in 2003 by 28 percent of 
employers, up from 22 percent in 2000 (PBMI).  There is some evidence that interest in this 
strategy will continue to grow: a 2002 survey reported that one-third of employers were very or 
somewhat likely to require use of step therapy edits in the next three years (Hewitt).  Employers 
may find this strategy useful if it limits use of an expensive drug that protects against a serious 
but rare side effect.  But they also worry about the need for extra physician visits or calls to the 
plan to get approval of a particular drug (Wye River Group on Healthcare).  For example, one 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) adopted an alternative step-therapy strategy, which employs 
category-specific programs with the goal of making step therapy a more employee-friendly cost 
containment mechanism.  For up to five selected drug classes, coverage is limited to the 
preferred drug unless the physician determines that it is not successful.  Then the non-preferred 
medication is automatically covered based on the presence of a prior claim for the preferred 
drug.  Clients can opt into these programs, and specific savings from programs are estimated at 
$4 to $9 per member per year depending on utilization (Drug Cost Management Report). 
 
Among state Medicaid programs, 27 states and the District of Columbia had a step therapy (fail 
first) requirement on one or more drugs in 2003, up substantially from three years earlier.  
Several state Medicaid programs have specifically targeted NSAIDs or Cox-2 inhibitors for their 
fail-first requirements.  Other states have targeted drugs for gastrointestinal conditions, 
especially proton-pump inhibitors (Prilosec, Prevacid), typically requiring that H2 blockers 
(Tagamet, Zantac) must be tried first.  Others drugs targeted for step therapy include Xenical, 
non-sedating antihistamines, and hypertension medications (Crowley et al.). 
 
A peer-reviewed study by PBM researchers (at AdvancePCS) looked at strategies for managing 
Cox-2 drugs (Celebrex, in particular), comparing four different approaches used by different 
client companies (Tucker et al.).  The study showed that the highest percentage savings came 
from step therapy (74 percent savings from what would have been paid without step therapy in 
effect).  The other approaches tested were prior authorization (second), a version of reference 
pricing (third), and three-tier copayment (least effective).  In this version of step therapy, the 
Cox-2 drug claim was paid only if the patient had used one of several therapies in the previous 
90 days – specifically, previous use of Cox-2 drugs or use of certain gastrointestinal drugs.  This 
study has two apparent limitations.  The first, noted by the authors, was that the plan using step 
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therapy was a relatively small plan.  The second is that the plan allowed use of gastrointestinal 
drugs to qualify as evidence that other therapies would be ineffective. 
 
An older study, published in JAMA, also tested step therapy for the use of NSAIDs (Jones et al.), 
requiring a trial of either ibuprofen or indomethacin before a prescription can be filled for a more 
expensive NSAID.  In this controlled trial, costs were reduced by 30 percent in the two sites 
using step therapy, compared to a 5 percent decrease in a site that used a computer cost-prompt 
when a prescription for the more expensive NSAID was presented and to a 2 percent increase 
where there was no intervention. 
 
Other evaluations conducted internally by PBMs (and not peer reviewed) also support the 
effectiveness of step therapy.  An internal study by Express Scripts researchers found a 12 
percent savings within the NSAID therapy category, although fewer than 1 percent of plan 
members were affected (Cox et al.).  Medco Health found that when a client used step therapy 
more broadly to encourage more use of generic drugs, the rate of generics dispensed rose from a 
little over 50 percent to nearly 90 percent in just twelve months.  In this case, the cost per day of 
therapy dropped from a little over $1.60 to just under $1.00 (Medco). 
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2c.  Therapeutic Substitution or Therapeutic Intervention 
 
Therapeutic substitution is a program designed to switch a patient from one medication to 
another that is on a preferred drug list or formulary.  Some specify the term “therapeutic 
intervention” rather than “therapeutic substitution” to emphasize the fact that the pharmacist or 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) can only intervene with the physician to get a new 
prescription as opposed to substituting an alternative drug without a new prescription.  By 
contrast, pharmacists generally can use generic substitution (section 2f) when there is a generic 
alternative to the prescribed brand-name drug. 
 
In the retail setting, the pharmacist may be required to contact the physician at the point of sale 
to see if the physician will authorize a switch to the preferred drug.  In some cases, the initial 
prescription would be filled, and the potential substitution would be researched prior to the refill 
prescription.  In the mail-order setting, the timing allows therapeutic substitution to work more 
easily.  The pharmacist has the time available to contact the prescribing physician, since the 
patient is not waiting to get the product. 
 
Physicians are generally not supportive of this approach or others that cause changes in their 
prescription decisions.  Although they retain the final decision on which drug the patient 
receives, they are concerned about both the loss of clinical autonomy and the reasons why certain 
drugs end up on the preferred list.  Physicians may contend that certain patients respond better to 
a particular drug from a given class or that a drug’s status on the preferred list or formulary may 
have more to do with the availability of a larger rebate than clinical criteria. 
 
In the private sector, about half of employers use therapeutic substitution as part of their arsenal 
of utilization management (PBMI).  Its popularity has declined in recent years because it is 
viewed as aggressive, especially in the retail setting, requiring a relatively heavy-handed 
approach compared to other techniques such as prior authorization or step therapy.  Because it 
requires the pharmacist or PBM to contract the prescribing physicians at the point of sale, it can 
create delays for the patient in getting a drug.  Tiered cost sharing has also become an alternative 
that places the choice (and financial consequences) of staying with the original prescription in 
the hands of the patient. 
 
In a recent variation, one health plan (Humana) introduced a system where the plan reviews drug 
claims for which a lower-cost brand or generic drug is available.  Through a computerized 
interactive voice response system, the patient receives a call explaining that he or she can save 
money by taking a substitute drug.  Humana estimated that 19 percent of the calls prompted 
patients to move to a lower-cost drug (Trude and Grossman). 
 
One PBM (AdvancePCS) has suggested that it can obtain savings of 1 to 5 percent through use 
of therapeutic substitution, but few peer-reviewed studies have been identified that evaluate the 
effectiveness of this strategy.  One such study looked at hypertension treatment in a VA 
Hospital.  Patients were converted from one calcium channel blocker drug to another less-
expensive but equally effective drug in the same class.  The researchers were surprised to 
discover that the total cost of drug therapy was higher after patients were converted.  Average 
blood pressure readings were lower, and there were no changes in the use of other health 
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services.  The difference seemed to be more total prescriptions filled, possibly explained by 
larger doses of the new medications than expected or higher patient compliance (Mamdani et 
al.).  Conversely, a retrospective analysis of the VA Pittsburgh Healthcare System found that six 
months after switching patients with gastrointestinal ailments from nizatidine to cimetidine, the 
Pittsburgh system generated $7,260 monthly in pharmaceutical cost savings without increased 
healthcare resource utilization (Good et al.). 
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2d.  Closed Formulary 
 
A formulary is a list of drugs selected by the health plan or its contracted pharmacy benefit 
manager (PBM) as drugs that are most useful in patient care, based on both clinical effectiveness 
and cost considerations.  The term “closed formulary” generally refers to a formulary where a 
relatively limited number of drugs are included and coverage by the plan is only permitted for 
drugs that are on the formulary list.  Enforcement of the closed formulary may be absolute, with 
no payment for drugs not on the list, except by appeal, or enforcement may be accomplished 
through prior authorization or some other exceptions process.  Where an exception is granted, it 
may be permitted for an extended period of time, for example, several years or the duration of 
the time when the enrollee has the drug benefit. 
 
Formularies are a tool for price negotiation.  By placing a drug on its formulary, the PBM or 
health plan may have increased leverage with manufacturers.  By creating the ability to steer 
utilization toward a particular drug, the plan can offer higher volume in exchange for a lower 
price or a higher rebate from the manufacturer.  A tighter formulary or stronger incentives will 
increase this leverage. 
 
Decisions about which drugs to include on a formulary are typically made by a committee of 
experts referred to as pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T) committees.  Made up of physicians, 
pharmacists, and other clinical experts, these committees review clinical evidence for all drugs in 
a given therapeutic class.  The formulary may exclude some drugs in a class, for example, older 
drugs that have been replaced in practice with safer, more effective alternatives.   
 
Where multiple drugs in a class are considered generally equivalent, the committee may narrow 
the list of alternatives based on clinical or cost factors (Health Policy Alternatives).  There is 
some literature addressing factors influencing formulary adoption decisions.  For example, at 
least two studies have found that visits by manufacturer representatives increase the likelihood 
that a particular drug will be on the formulary (Chren and Landefeld; Dranove et al.).  According 
to a 2001 study of formulary use in California, health plans rated quality of care, managing costs, 
and maximizing rebates as the most important factors in designing their formularies, while 
employer and physician satisfaction were rated least important.  Among the national PBMs, 
quality of care and managing costs were also listed as the two most important factors – followed 
by member satisfaction (William M. Mercer). 
 
A recent trend is to take a more systematic approach to bringing scientific evidence to bear in the 
decision of what drugs to include in a formulary (Neumann).  Regence Blue Shield (based in 
Seattle, Washington), for example, started asking drug manufacturers to present a dossier of 
clinical and economic evidence in support of their drugs before they are reviewed for inclusion 
on the formulary.  The state of Oregon requested reviews of scientific literature before making 
decisions on what drugs to include on a preferred drug list (see section 5d for more discussion of 
the development of unbiased information on the effectiveness of drugs).  One PBM that used a 
pharmacoeconomic approach to developing formulary guidelines for depression prescription 
drug therapies saw a 25 percent increase in drug therapy compliance, while overall medical costs 
dropped by 10 percent (White).  
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In the private sector, few employers (3 percent) have retained the use of closed formularies 
(PBMI).  Their declining popularity resulted directly from plan enrollees expressing a strong 
preference for plan designs that offer more choice.  Many physicians also oppose restrictive 
formularies because of their limitation on prescribing practice and physician authority (Levy and 
Cocks).  Employers have shifted to tiered copayment schemes, typically based on an open 
formulary (sections 2e and 3b).  In these arrangements, plan members can obtain any drug by 
paying a higher copayment, and the plan does not need to be in a position of denying coverage.  
This trend has occurred even though PBMs tend to believe that substantial savings (as high as 15 
percent) are available with a closed formulary (AdvancePCS). 
 
Medicaid programs that participate in the Medicaid drug rebate program are not permitted by law 
to have a closed formulary.  States must cover all drugs (other than the specific class exclusions, 
noted in section 1a) that are made by any manufacturer that participates in the rebate program.  
States typically used prior authorization (section 2a) or a preferred drug list (section 2e) in lieu of 
a closed formulary.  For the 30 states that used formularies before passage of the 1990 law 
banning them, the availability of drugs increased significantly, according to a study published in 
1996.  Some of the drugs that became more widely available were of questionable therapeutic 
value, according to a panel of physicians consulted in the study.  In addition, the researchers 
found an increased use of prior approval requirements (Walser et al.). 
 
In Medicare, however, closed formularies have become more common.  In 2002, about 89 
percent of enrollees with drug coverage through Medicare+Choice were in plans that used a 
formulary, and about 37 percent had closed formularies that covered only drugs on the formulary 
(dropping to 34 percent in 2003) (Achman and Gold; personal communication).  And there is 
some evidence that plans use tighter formularies for M+C than for commercial business, with 
one plan executive reporting that the plan eliminates about 10 percent of high-cost drugs from its 
M+C formulary.  Some plans even used a closed formulary without an exceptions process 
(Draper et al.). 
 
Another major public-sector use of closed formularies is the Veterans Affairs National 
Formulary, which has closed a subset of drug classes, limiting coverage to one or two drugs in 
those classes unless a waiver is obtained from a physician.  The Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
found that this formulary affected utilization, prices, and market share of drugs in closed and 
preferred classes compared to the drugs in open classes (Blumenthal and Herdman).  The IOM 
estimated that the market share for covered drugs rose between 35 percent and 80 percent, with 
the highest shift occurring for proton pump inhibitors.  Overall, the VA saved $100 million over 
the 2-year span after which the formulary was implemented, which is about 15 percent of 
expenditures in the six analyzed drug classes.  A peer-reviewed article assessed the impact of the 
VA formulary on market share, drug prices, and drug spending.  Where a class of drugs was 
closed, 85 percent to 97 percent of the market went to the on-formulary drug (up from 16 percent 
to 47 percent before the class was closed).  By contrast, use of the preferred drug in another 
class, where the formulary was not closed, rose from 15 percent to only 23 percent (Huskamp et 
al.). 
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A peer-reviewed study by PBM researchers compared an employer plan that implemented a 
closed formulary in July 1997 with a control that used an open formulary (Motheral and 
Henderson).  They found that the closed formulary was associated with significantly lower 
increases in utilization and expenditures, after controlling for differences in age, gender, and 
chronic disease scores.  They also found that those using the closed formulary had a higher use 
of prior authorization and a reduced rate of continuation with chronic medications in the nine 
months following its implementation.   
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2e.  Preferred Drug List or Open Formulary 
 
A preferred drug list, sometimes referred to as an open formulary, is a list of drugs selected by 
the health plan or its contracted pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) as drugs that are most useful 
in patient care, based on both clinical effectiveness and cost considerations (see section 2d on 
closed formularies for a discussion of how formularies are established).  By contrast with a 
closed formulary, the preferred drug list allows use of drugs not on the list.  Preferred drug lists 
are combined with other rules, such as prior authorization or tiered copayments, to create an 
incentive to use the preferred drugs. 
 
In the private sector, while open formularies are far more popular than closed formularies and 
were used by 26 percent of employers in 2003, this mechanism has declined in the private sector 
from 67 percent of employers who reported having open formularies in 1999 (PBMI).  Another 
71 percent of employers were using “incented” formularies, which refers to open formularies that 
are linked to tiered copayments.  For purposes of this report, open and “incented” formularies are 
not treated as distinct strategies.  
 
As described in section 2d, state Medicaid programs are not permitted to maintain closed 
formularies.  Preferred drug lists, usually in conjunction with prior authorization requirements, 
represent a relatively new approach for state Medicaid programs, one that is growing rapidly in 
popularity.  California has had such a system in place for many years, but it was alone in that 
regard for much of that time.  A 2003 survey found that 18 states were implementing some form 
of preferred drug list (Crowley et al.). 
 
In 2001, Florida created a preferred drug list for its Medicaid program.  For a drug to be included 
on the list, a manufacturer has to agree to make rebate payments to the state in addition to the 
federal rebates.  Drugs not on the list can be obtained only through prior authorization.  The state 
reached an agreement with several manufacturers that their drugs could be included on the 
preferred drug list based on provision of disease management and health education services 
instead of supplemental cash rebates.  In 2004, the Florida legislature decided to end these 
alternate programs in 2005, citing that savings were less than accomplished through the rebates. 
 
Later in 2001, Michigan created a preferred drug list that applies to Medicaid and all other state-
funded drug programs.  The state used a panel to select at least two “best in class” drugs from 
each of 40 therapeutic classes based on criteria of clinical effectiveness, safety, outcomes, and 
cost.  For drugs not selected for the list, the manufacturer must offer rebates adequate to reduce 
the price to that of the lowest price among the selected drugs for that therapeutic class.   
 
Early case studies of Michigan and Florida noted some implementation issues (Bernasek et 
al./2003; Bernasek et al./2002).  For example, the Michigan list was found to be more restrictive 
in the range of drugs included compared to other such lists.  Categories of particular concern 
were cardiovascular, antidepressants, and diabetes medications.  By contrast, the Florida list was 
no more restrictive than that of a large private plan.  Also, there were early concerns reported in 
Michigan that the administrative burden to obtain prior authorization was considerable and might 
harm beneficiaries.  While some of these issues were lessened over time, other administrative 
problems arose.  In Florida, there were initial concerns about whether beneficiaries were given 
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adequate information on the new procedures.  A formal evaluation has been mandated by the 
Michigan legislature. 
 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have gone to court to block implementation of some of the state 
preferred drug lists.  To date, the courts have sided generally with the states, allowing the 
preferred drug lists to stay in place.  In addition, if a state designs a more restrictive list, it tends 
to run into opposition from physician and patient groups as well – especially if the exceptions 
process is difficult to use. 
 
Most of these state preferred drug lists are too new to have formal evaluations of their impact.  
An article in The New York Times reported that Florida is claiming savings of $200 million per 
year, while Michigan is saving $45 million (Perez-Pena).  Indications are that some of the widely 
advertised drugs are often excluded from the preferred list in favor of older, less expensive 
alternatives.  Some early reports have suggested that when a manufacturer has a drug excluded 
from one state’s list, it becomes more aggressive to get that drug included on other state lists.  
 
Many of the peer-reviewed studies that consider the effectiveness of formularies focus on the 
incentives (most often prior authorization or tiered cost sharing) used to steer utilization to drugs 
on the formulary rather than on the subject of formulary management (see especially sections 2a, 
3b, and 3c).  For example, one study of health plan design and management features found that 
features such as prior authorization and formulary management used together with higher 
copayments tend to be associated with differences in the types and costs of prescriptions that 
seniors use (Thomas et al.).  PBMs assert generally that use of formularies is a major factor in 
obtaining savings for their clients.  Medco Health, for example, states that formulary 
management in general can save up to 11 percent or more of drug spending (Medco).  
 
One peer-reviewed study focused on the role of formularies for psychotropic drugs (Huskamp).  
Some evidence suggests that patients tend to respond differently to alternative drugs for mental 
health conditions (such as depression) more so than for other health conditions (although 
treatment for hypertension raises some of the same issues).  As a result, consumers are less likely 
to change psychotropic drugs in response to incentives to use drugs on the formulary and are 
more willing to incur the higher copayments or go through authorization procedures to stay with 
a drug that has been working for them.  Another factor that potentially influences the 
effectiveness of formularies for psychotropic drugs is that Medicaid is responsible for a large 
share of all use for these drug classes, meaning that Medicaid decisions can have a 
disproportionate influence on investment decisions by drug manufacturers.  Finally, managed 
behavioral health care carve-out vendor contracts typically cover only specialty inpatient and 
outpatient treatments and do not place the vendor at financial risk for psychotropic drugs.  As a 
result, such vendors have no incentive to control psychotropic drug costs. 
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2f.  Mandatory Generic Substitution 
 
Mandatory generic substitution refers to the policy of a health plan to pay only for a generic 
drug, unless no generic equivalent is available.  Generic drugs are products no longer covered by 
patent protection and thus may be produced or distributed by multiple drug companies.  Most 
plans adopting this policy make some provision for the patient’s physician to specify that the 
brand-name drug should be dispensed.  This policy can be as easy as designating “dispense as 
written” on the prescription or as difficult as requesting an exception with an indication of why 
the generic drug is ineffective for the particular patient.  Mandatory generic substitution amounts 
to a special case of a closed formulary (section 2d), where no brand-name drug with an available 
generic equivalent is listed on the formulary.  It is also a case of reference pricing (section 3f), 
but restricted to generic drug situations only.  According to one survey, about 20 percent of 
covered workers had mandatory use of generic drugs (Kaiser/HRET). 
 
Generally, state laws allow pharmacists to fill a prescription with a generic drug even in those 
cases where the doctor has written a prescription for a brand-name drug.  The specific provisions 
of state laws vary.  For example, in about 40 states, the pharmacist can substitute the generic 
drug unless the prescribing physician indicates in writing on the prescription “no substitution” or 
that the brand drug is “medically necessary.”  In a subset of these states, the law mandates that 
the pharmacist substitute the generic drug.  In most states, the pharmacist must obtain the 
consent of the patient or at least must inform the patient that a generic drug is being substituted 
(NIHCM Foundation). 
 
Some state Medicaid programs have increased the steps that a physician must take to insist on a 
brand-name drug.  For example, in November 2001, Massachusetts imposed a requirement that 
Medicaid beneficiaries receive generic medications in all cases except where physicians 
demonstrate that a brand-name drug is medically necessary and they get prior approval from the 
state.  This replaced a policy where the pharmacist was required to substitute a generic drug 
unless the physicians requested a brand-name drug.  The suspicion was that many doctors were 
routinely requesting the brand-name drug, and the new rules increases the steps the doctor must 
take to request the brand-name drug. 
 
The potential for savings from increased use of generic drugs is substantial.  One study, 
conducted in 2001 by researchers at Brandeis University with funding from the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, found that optimal use of generic drugs could yield significant 
savings for a Medicare drug benefit.  Currently, seniors in managed-care plans use generic drugs 
at a rate of 38 percent.  Should the rate of generic use achieved by the plans with highest generic 
use (about 51 percent) be met by plans serving all seniors, a 16 percent savings per individual 
would be generated (Ritter et al.). 
 
One pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) has estimated that it can save up to 4 percent from 
generic incentives and education, although it does not provide a separate estimate for mandatory 
generic substitution (Medco).  Another PBM (AdvancePCS) estimates savings in the range of 6 
to 10 percent when requiring clinically appropriate generic substitution (AdvancePCS). 
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A 2002 peer-reviewed study looked at mandatory generic substitution along with other benefit 
designs such as tiered cost sharing by analyzing claims data for 25 private employers for 1997 to 
1999 with a total of 55 different benefit packages for a working-age population.  Mandatory 
generic substitution lowered drug costs significantly – by about 8 percent in plans with two-
tiered cost sharing.  Spending was reduced on both multi-source and single-source brand-name 
drugs, without any increase in spending on generics (Joyce et al.). 
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2g.  Management of Specialty Drugs 
 
The term “specialty drugs” most commonly refers to drugs that are administered in a physician’s 
office or in some other situation where the patient needs assistance to administer the drug.  The 
major category of specialty drugs is chemotherapy drugs, most of which are administered by 
infusion under a physician’s supervision.  Injectable drugs for diseases such as multiple sclerosis 
also fall into this category, as do blood products provided to patients with hemophilia and similar 
diseases. 
 
In Medicare, specialty drugs – specifically, any drug that can normally not be self-administered, 
plus several other categories provided by law – are the only drugs paid for on an outpatient basis 
(prior to implementation of the new outpatient drug benefit in 2006).  Before 2004, Medicare 
paid physicians for these drugs at the rate of 95 percent of the average wholesale price (AWP).  
The Medicare Modernization Act reduced this payment rate to 85 percent of AWP for most of 
these drugs and substituted a pricing system based on 106 percent of a newly defined average 
sales price (ASP) in 2005.  In 2006, a competitive acquisition program will be established for 
vendors to bid for contracts to purchase and distribute drugs in regional competitive acquisition 
areas.  Medicare will pay selected vendors directly.  Each year physicians will be able to select a 
contractor through the competitive acquisition program or receive Medicare payments for drugs 
based on 106 percent of ASP.  
 
Private purchasers have typically used a similar system to Medicare’s AWP-based system, 
although adjustments above or below AWP vary.  Specialty drugs tend to be included under a 
health plan’s medical benefit, rather than under its outpatient drug benefit.  Some plans have 
been looking at reducing the payment rate to achieve cost savings.  Others have initiated pilot 
programs to change the method by which specialty drugs are purchased and distributed.  For 
example, they might require physicians to use a designated distributor for specialty drugs, where 
that distributor uses its increased volume to obtain a lower price from the manufacturer.  One 
health plan worked with a single supplier to provide certain injectable products (especially those 
for hemophilia), with the goal of both streamlining the distribution process and making claims 
submission more efficient (MedPAC; NORC/Georgetown).   
 
In other cases, health plans may incorporate specialty drugs into their systems of tiered cost 
sharing.  Humana, for example, has initiated a policy where specialty drugs are on a fourth tier.  
In contrast to the first three tiers that require a fixed copayment, the fourth tier requires the plan 
member to pay 25 percent of the cost of the drug up to an annual copayment maximum (see 
section 3d for a further discussion of four-tiered systems). 
 
Although some private payers suggest they can achieve 10 to 25 percent savings by making 
changes to the way they pay for specialty drugs and even greater savings if implemented in 
conjunction with increased utilization review, no published studies document these savings 
claims.  
 
 
 
  
Page 34
Literature 
 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the Congress: Variation and Innovation 
in Medicare, June 2003. 
 
NORC at the University of Chicago and Georgetown University, “Physician-Administered Drugs: 
Distribution and Payment Issues in the Private Sector,” report submitted to the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission, available online at http://www.medpac.gov/, August 2003. 
  
Page 35
2h.  Provider Financial Incentives 
 
A growing number of insurers have experimented with programs where providers are offered 
financial incentives for meeting certain performance incentives.  In the drug arena, insurers 
might offer incentives for increased use of generic drugs or for meeting certain target rates of use 
for preferred drugs.   
 
A 1991 article in Benefits Quarterly describes some of the issues that need to be addressed in 
requiring physicians to take capitation payments for the cost of drugs and the potential for cost 
savings under this approach.  The author noted that in setting capitation rates, it is important to 
pay attention to enrollee-related variables and medication-related variables, as well as 
operational costs.  In the end, he asserted that a capitation system has more cost management 
potential than tradition fee-for-service payment (Lawson).  Physicians, however, may be 
reluctant to accept risk for drug costs.  Although they decide whether to prescribe a needed drug, 
they cannot control either their patients’ health conditions or the prices charged for drugs.  For 
this system to work, it would require an accurate approach to risk adjusting the capitated 
payments and to other operational issues such as sorting out prescriptions written by other 
physicians treating the same patient. 
 
AdvancePCS reports that large medical groups in California during the mid-1990s assumed 
financial risk for the prescription drug costs of their patients, leading in turn to more conservative 
prescribing habits.  With the more recent rapid rise in drugs costs, providers have generally 
renegotiated their risk contracts to eliminate this type of risk sharing.  There is some suggestion 
that future contracts may incorporate more limited risk arrangements (AdvancePCS; William M. 
Mercer). 
 
No published studies have been identified that have examined the use of financial incentives for 
providers for meeting certain standards for prescription drug use. 
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2i.  Payment to Pharmacies as Incentives 
 
Some pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) have a system of performance-based pharmacy 
reimbursement.  They provide incentive payments to those pharmacies that meet standards for 
dispensing generic drugs, dispensing preferred brand-name drugs from the formulary, or more 
generally meeting standards as measured in drug utilization review programs.   
 
In addition, there are various proposals and some testing of programs to reimburse pharmacists 
for cognitive services for counseling patients on the appropriate use of drugs.  One challenge is 
how to distinguish between the normal services expected of a pharmacist and special services 
that might justify an extra payment (Fox).  The evaluation of one pilot conducted in the 
Washington Medicaid program found no increase in the use of cognitive services as a result of 
additional payment (Kidder and Bae). 
 
One peer-reviewed study did report on the use of a tiered reimbursement program that provides 
incentives to pharmacists for higher rates of generic dispensing.  Priority Health, a managed care 
organization in western Michigan, created an incentive payment that ranged from $0.50 per 
prescription for a generic dispensing rate of at least 26 percent to $2.50 if the rate was at least 47 
percent.  Over a five-year period (1992 to 1997), the plan’s overall generic dispensing rose from 
37 percent to 47 percent, while the national average only grew from 39 percent to 41 percent 
(both rates were slightly higher in 1995 and 1996 than in 1997) (Keating). 
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2j. Other Coverage Management Approaches 
 
There are a variety of other coverage management approaches that do not fit easily in the 
categories outlined in this section.   
 
For example, dose optimization refers to situations where a single pill of a higher dosage taken 
once a day can replace lower-strength pills of the same medications taken several times a day.  
Medco Health describes a plan it implemented for one client for dose optimization.  It moved 
patients on a cholesterol-lowering medication from a dosage requiring two pills a day to a single 
pill a day and reported that doing so achieved a 21 percent savings for the client (Medco). 
 
A similar approach, which has been gaining in popularity, is pill splitting.  In many cases, 50-
milligram and 100-milligram pills may cost the same amount, or at least the price of the larger 
pill is considerably less than double that of the smaller pill, despite containing double the amount 
of medication.  Some health plans have proposed to prescribe the larger pill and have the patient 
cut them in half to reduce costs.  Other plans have preferred not to take this approach, raising 
patient safety concerns.  Manufacturers are typically opposed, also arguing on patient safety 
grounds that the split pill may not have the correct dosage or that patients will forget and take the 
entire pill.  Frail patients in particular may find pill splitting a burden.  In addition, pill splitting 
can lead to wastage if some pills shatter (Brubaker).   
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 3. Utilization Strategies: Cost Sharing Approaches 
 
Cost sharing is both a way to reduce costs for the payer by transferring some of the costs to the 
patient and a way to influence utilization by providing monetary incentives to patients for 
reducing the number of prescriptions filled or for shifting to a lower cost drug.  These 
approaches are often used in conjunction with utilization management approaches (section 2), 
such as a preferred drug list. 
 
a. Copayments as a general strategy 
b. Tiered copayments in general 
c. Three-tiered copayments  
d. Four-tiered or other more complex copayment structures 
e. Coinsurance 
f. Reference pricing 
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3a.  Copayments as a General Strategy 
 
A copayment is a fixed charge that is paid by patients for each medication they purchase.  In 
general, copayments are used to induce the patient to incur a price for using a medication and 
thus to consider more carefully whether a medication is useful to him or her.  According to 
economic theory, copayments should control over-utilization by providing an incentive to either 
discontinue treatment or to decide not to initiate treatment.  The goal is to discourage 
unnecessary utilization, but at least for lower-income patients, it may also have the effect of 
reducing use of necessary drugs.  The critical issue thus is whether a copayment is more likely to 
deter inappropriate use of drugs or to induce people to reduce their use of needed drugs.   
 
Federal Medicaid statute limits copayments to nominal amounts (defined by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to be from $.50 to $3.00 per prescription) and further specifies that a 
beneficiary’s “inability to pay” cannot prevent him or her from receiving medications.  However, 
according to a peer-reviewed study, elderly and disabled Medicaid beneficiaries who resided in 
states that implemented a copayment system on prescription drugs have significantly lower drug 
use than those who reside in states without copayments (Stuart and Zacker).  Consistent with 
these findings, the Center for Studying Health System Change analyzed state Medicaid cost 
containment strategies such as copayments, dispensing limits, generic substitution, prior 
authorization and step-therapy protocols and determined that while there may be definite savings 
with the implementation of such cost containment mechanisms, there may be a reduction of 
beneficiary access to needed drug therapies (Cunningham). 
 
A study published in 1974 found relatively inelastic demand for drugs and a minimal price effect 
for copayments (Phelps and Newhouse).  A subsequent study published in 1985 measured levels 
of drug expenditures corresponding to the generosity of an individual’s insurance coverage for 
drugs.  It found that individuals with more generous insurance buy more prescription drugs, 
while the proportion of brand-name drugs purchased in pharmacies was not a function of 
insurance plan (Leibowitz et al.).   
 
Other studies have found reduced utilization from cost sharing, although the amount varied by 
the circumstances.  For example, there is some evidence of physicians writing prescriptions for 
fewer drugs to diminish the impact of higher copayments.  In a series of studies, researchers 
looked at the use of drugs by Medicaid beneficiaries in South Carolina after imposition of a 50-
cent copayment in 1976.  The first study found that patients reduced their use of medications 
when faced with a copayment (Nelson et al.).  In a second study, the same research team found 
that the effect differed by class of drugs:  there was a significant effect of copayments on all drug 
categories except analgesics and sedative/hypnotic drugs.  Long-term effects were clearest for 
cardiovascular, cholinergic, diuretic, and psychotherapeutic agents.  Use of these drugs declined 
significantly in the long term.  The suggested conclusion is that patients were less likely to 
reduce use of pain medications, sleeping pills, or other drugs for which the effect was relatively 
immediate and obvious.  They were more likely to reduce use of drugs for hypertension or other 
conditions where the effect of reducing or discontinuing the use of a medication was less obvious 
to the patient yet significant from a clinical perspective (Reeder and Nelson). 
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Two other peer-reviewed studies found similar results on reduced spending.  In one study, 
Johnson and his colleagues examined the impact of increased cost sharing on two groups of 
elderly patients enrolled in Medicare HMOs.  Specifically, drug copayments were increased from 
$1 to $5 for the first group of elderly patients, and coinsurance was increased from 50 percent 
(maximum of $25) to 70 percent (maximum of $30) per prescription for a second group.  These 
increases resulted in lower annual prescription drug utilization and expenses.  However, no 
consistent changes were observed in either medical care utilization (office visits, emergency 
room visits, home health visits, hospitalizations) or total medical care expenses (Johnson et al.).  
Another study found that a change in prescription drug copayments from $3 to $5 for a set of 
employer groups was associated with a 5 percent decrease in prescription drug utilization, a 10 
percent decrease in overall employer prescription drug costs per person and an increase in 
employee costs of approximately $2 per prescription (Smith).   
 
A peer-reviewed study, published in 2001, focused on increased cost sharing imposed in Quebec.  
It found that, after imposition of higher cost sharing, patients took fewer drugs identified by the 
researchers as “essential” and that these same patients experienced an increased use of 
emergency room visits and admissions to hospitals or nursing homes.  There was also a decline 
in the use of “less essential” drugs, but this change was not associated with an increase in the use 
of other health services (Tamblyn et al.). 
 
A study published in 2004 looked at the important questions of whether the effect of increased 
cost sharing has a differential across major classes of drugs (Goldman et al.).  The research team 
found that doubling copayments led to reduced use in eight therapeutic classes, with the largest 
decreases occurring for non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS) and antihistamines.  
The smallest reductions were for drugs to treat diabetes, hypertension, and depression.  They 
suggest that the smallest reductions occurred for drugs with greater consequences for missed 
doses, whereas the largest reductions corresponded to medications taken intermittently to reduce 
symptoms.  This finding is accentuated by looking at those patients receiving ongoing care from 
a chronic illness, for whom drug use was less responsive to copayment changes.  There were also 
higher responses for drugs that had over-the-counter substitutes and for brand drugs versus 
generic drugs. 
 
Another study found circumstances where higher cost sharing did not have a consistent effect on 
the use of drugs based on the financial incentives faced by prescribing physicians.  This peer-
reviewed study discussed the effectiveness of higher prescription drug copayments in two 
different physician compensation models:  an independent practice association (IPA) and a 
network-model HMO.  Unlike the IPA model where physicians are not at risk for drug costs, the 
network model placed physicians at financial risk for their prescribing behavior.  The results of 
the study found that higher copayments were associated with lower drug spending in IPA models 
but had little effect in network models (Hillman et al.). 
 
A variation on the use of copayments is referred to as a benefit-based copay system.  This system 
is slightly different than other copayment or tiered copayment systems in that it takes into 
account the medical necessity of a prescribed drug along with its actual cost.  Patients who have 
a high potential benefit from a particular drug would have a lower copayment than patients with 
lower potential benefits.  This benefit-based system provides a financial incentive for individuals 
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to prioritize their out-of-pocket drug expenditures based on the value of their medications, not 
their price (Fendrick et al.).   
 
Humana introduced a version of this benefit-based approach, where the level of cost sharing is 
based more on the use of the drug than on the price of the drug.  The plan pays the highest 
amount toward the cost for those drugs that treat acute illnesses (e.g., antibiotics) or those that 
keep patients out of the hospital.  It pays the next highest amount toward maintenance drugs, 
such as those to treat hypertension, AIDS, or cancer.  The plan pays a lower allowance for drugs 
that the patient can live without but which boost workplace productivity (e.g., allergy 
medications).  It makes the smallest payment toward drugs that have no medical payback, but 
which improve lifestyle (e.g., drugs for acne, hair loss, or sexual dysfunction) (Drug Cost 
Management Report). 
 
Medco Health tells clients that cost sharing in general can generate savings of up to 10 percent or 
more (Medco/2004).  It should be noted that in this estimate, they are including other types of 
cost sharing, such as deductibles and benefit maximums.  Their analysis (not peer reviewed) also 
shows evidence that as member cost share increases, the growth rate for utilization moderates.  
For example, they suggest that a 2 percent to 5 percent increase in cost sharing slows the rate of 
spending growth from 8 percent to about 6 percent.  A 10 percent or greater increase in cost 
sharing reduces the spending growth rate to zero.  Yet they also show that utilization changes 
affect both essential and “less essential” medications.  For example, when cost sharing is 
increased by 10 percent or more, the rate of growth in less essential medications drops from 
about 14 percent to negative growth of 3 percent.  At the same time, the rate of growth in 
essential medications drops from about 7 percent to about 1 percent.  
 
For a privately insured population, Medco Health makes a recommendation that members 
contribute overall no more than about 25 percent to 35 percent of drug costs, presumably 
including share of premiums.  This recommendation seems to reflect a concern that raising the 
members’ share of costs too high can raise other health costs or impair health (Medco/2002).  
 
Finally, one complication occurs for drugs that sell at a very low price.  A Wall Street Journal 
article warned consumers to be careful when purchasing generic drugs under a plan’s copayment 
system.  The case example in the article highlighted a consumer who paid $5 for a generic heart 
medication for which the plan negotiated a $.76 price (Martinez).  In many cases, copays are 
defined as the lower of the plan amount or the actual cost of the drug, but in some cases, the 
consumer may be charged the copay amount even if it is higher. 
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3b.  Tiered Copayments in General 
 
Tiered copayments are used to vary cost sharing based on the type of drug being purchased.  The 
simplest form of tiered copayments is the use of two different copayments for generic and brand-
name drugs.  Other forms of tiered copayment may add separate tiers for preferred and non-
preferred brand-name drugs.  The purpose is to steer consumers away from more expensive non-
preferred drugs to lower-cost preferred medications. 
 
In the private sector, tiered copayments have become the norm.  In 2004, 65 percent of covered 
workers faced 3-tier copayments, 20 percent faced 2-tier copayments, and 3 percent faced 4-tier 
copayments (Kaiser/HRET).  Only 10 percent were not subject to tiered copayments.  Workers in 
small firms were somewhat less likely to face tiered copayments than those in large firms.  
Workers in conventional plans were considerably less likely to face tiered copayments in 
conventional insurance arrangements than in HMOs, PPOs, or point-of-service plans.  Average 
copayments were $10 for generic drugs, $21 for preferred drugs, and $33 for non-preferred 
drugs.  Oftentimes plans with multi-tiered copayment structures have other cost saving 
mechanisms in place, such as mail-order programs. 
 
As noted in section 3a, federal Medicaid statute limits copayments to nominal amounts.  Within 
these limits, there are about ten state Medicaid programs where copayments for brand-name 
drugs were higher than for generics, according to a 2003 survey (Crowley et al.).  Some 
additional states have higher copays for higher-cost drugs.  In Medicare+Choice plans, tiered 
copayments have become the norm.  Generally, plans have a similar structure as for their 
commercial counterparts but often with higher copayment amounts (Draper et al.).  Most 
frequently, copays for generic drugs are $10 or less, while those for brand-name drugs are at 
least $20, with a typical ratio between the copays of between 2:1 and 3:1 (Achman and Gold). 
 
Results for other benefit surveys were quite consistent, allowing for differences in how the 
surveys were designed and reported.  However, one report that looked at patterns in California 
suggested that the adoption of three-tier schemes was occurring more slowly in that state, 
perhaps because more plans there used closed formularies and that employees were reasonably 
satisfied with their current arrangements (William M. Mercer Inc.). 
 
The impact of tiered copayments on drug utilization has been the subject of several studies.  One 
peer-reviewed study of people enrolled in employer-sponsored insurance found that members in 
a plan with a single $5 copay for all drugs used drugs the most, with an average annual per 
member spending of $725.  Use of a $10 copay reduced the annual average drug cost for the plan 
to $563 per member.  For two-tier plans, doubling copayments from $5 for generics and $10 for 
brand drugs to $10 and $20 reduced plan costs from $678 to $455.  Adding an additional 
copayment of $30 for non-preferred brand drugs to a two-tier plan ($10 generics; $20 brand) 
lowered overall drug spending by 4 percent while requiring mandatory generic substitution in a 
two-tier plan reduced drug spending by 8 percent.  Doubling copayments in a two-tier plan 
increased the share that beneficiaries' paid out-of-pocket from 18 percent to 26 percent.  Overall, 
increased copayments or adding a new level of copayments reduced plan expenditures for 
working aged people enrolled in employer health plans.  The reduction mainly benefited health 
insurance plans because of increased beneficiary out-of-pocket costs (Joyce et al.).   
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Two other recent peer-reviewed studies showed that tiered cost sharing led to more use of the 
preferred drugs.  One study, published in 2004, found that tiered plans are associated with the 
utilization of specific types of drugs for hypertension. The likelihood of receiving more 
expensive therapies was lower among enrollees in two-tier plans with the highest copayment 
differentials than for those in single-tier plans with the lowest copayments (Kamal-Bal and 
Briesacher).  Another study, published in 2003, found that tiered copayment systems were 
associated with a significant shift from non-preferred to lower-cost preferred brand prescription 
drugs (Rector et al.).  Other studies emphasize that, while tiered copays provide consumers with 
a wider choice of prescriptions (compared to the use of closed formularies) and plans are saving 
money, consumers have increased cost burden under tiered cost sharing (Mays et al.). 
 
A two-year review of 8.1 million people in 246 three-tier plans found that 70 percent of the 
plans’ total drug spending was for preferred drugs in a system that one pharmacy benefit 
manager (Advance PCS) refers to as a guide to drugs in select therapeutic categories that are 
more cost effective than other drugs for its members – but not a formulary.  The implementation 
of a three-tiered copayment system saved these plans $1.62 billion in 2001.  Members’ costs per 
month grew by 4.5 percent during 2001 compared with the national trend of 13 to 17 percent 
(AdvancePCS). 
 
The Congressional Budget Office, in its 2002 review of design issues for a Medicare drug 
benefit, suggests that tiered copayments may offer health plans the greatest opportunity to save 
money where a therapeutic class includes only a few distinct drugs, all of which are protected by 
patents.  In this situation, the pharmacy benefit manager can allow manufacturers of the 
therapeutically equivalent drugs to bid for preferred status by offering rebates; the confidentiality 
of the rebate amounts should encourage stiffer competition compared to the more public 
approach of reference pricing.  The degree of savings, according to CBO, will depend on the 
tiered copayment rates, number of tiers, and the breadth of the therapeutic classes.  If broader 
therapeutic classes are established, more drugs are placed into competition with each other and 
classes are more likely to include drugs with generic alternatives.  For example, if Cox-2 
inhibitors are placed in competition with other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, a pricing 
system can create more incentives to avoid the more expensive Cox-2 drugs.  But others argue 
that this situation is more likely to reduce incentives for pharmaceutical research and 
development (CBO). 
 
One question in the Medicaid context is whether small differences (say $1 for generics versus $3 
for brand-name drugs) provide a meaningful incentive to the beneficiary to choose the generic 
drug.  No studies have been located that test the effectiveness of this small copayment difference, 
although one peer-reviewed study suggests that “even very small Medicaid copayments deter 
drug use” by reducing the likelihood that beneficiaries fill any prescriptions during the year.  The 
authors of this study also found that beneficiaries in less than very good health in copay states 
filled fewer prescriptions on average than in non-copay states (Stuart and Zacker). 
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3c.  Three-Tiered Copayments 
 
Three-tiered copayment arrangements usually refer to systems where the insurer or purchaser 
creates one copayment amount for generic drugs and two different amounts for brand-name 
drugs based on whether they are on a formulary or preferred drug list.  In some cases, the second 
and third tiers are divided between brand drugs where a generic is available (multi-source drugs) 
and those for which no generic is available.  Most private purchasers use tiered copayments (see 
section 3b for specific estimates of use of three-tier copayments in private plans). 
 
The pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) that implement different cost sharing mechanisms 
generally estimate (from non-peer-reviewed studies) that switching from a two-tier copayment 
system to three-tier copayments yields savings between about 5 percent and 15 percent.  Express 
Scripts, for example, cited that adding a higher third tier to the two existing tiers could save 
between 7 percent and 8 percent of overall drug costs for a health plan.  AdvancePCS claimed 
savings of 16 percent in the cardiovascular class and 10 percent in the psychotherapeutic class.  
Various analyses have suggested that the largest source of savings is from the higher copayments 
themselves, with lesser savings coming from the use of lower cost drugs or possibly higher 
rebates.  IMS data show that savings in three-tiered copayment plans were only slightly greater 
than those in two-tier plans, while doubling copayments in plans with multiple tiers reduced 
average drug spending by 33 percent (Long). 
 
A 2003 peer-reviewed study compared claims data from two employer-sponsored health plans 
that changed their formulary structures.  The first plan changed from a one-tier to a three-tier 
formulary and increased copayments for all covered medicines.  The second plan switched from 
a two-tier to a three-tier formulary changing only the tier-3 copayment.  Plan one experienced a 
significant decrease in the probability of the use of any drug in a given class and the cost burden 
shifted to the enrollee compared with those enrollees in plan two. While some enrollees in plan 
one switched to cheaper tier-1 or tier-2 alternatives, the study showed that some stopped taking 
medications in these classes altogether (Huskamp et al.). 
 
According to some experts, the effectiveness of a tiered copayment system lies in the relative 
prices of each tier.  To affect utilization, tiered copayments must be structured in multiples, such 
as X for generic drugs, 2X for formulary brands, and 3X or 4X for non-formulary brands; put 
another way, differentials between tiers must be closer to $15 than $5 (Darves; Segedin). 
 
Two studies conducted by PBM researchers have been published in peer-reviewed journals.  
Researchers at Express Scripts looked at the experience of a PPO population in a single 
midwestern state over a 24-month period from 1997 to 1999.  The test group added a three-tier 
copay ($8/$15/$25) at the 12-month mark of the study.  Payer costs dropped 17.1 percent, with 
9.9 percent attributed to the absolute increase in copayments, 5.3 percent to reduced utilization, 
and 1.9 percent to the lower cost of the substituted drugs.  The authors estimated that if the lower 
two tiers had remained at the pre-change level (thus, only adding the third tier) savings would 
have been reduced to 6.4 percent.  There was no evidence of adverse health effects (Motheral 
and Fairman).  Another (unpublished) study by Express Scripts researchers found that aggressive 
copay changes yielded even higher savings.  An important factor that goes into the effectiveness 
of a three-tiered copayment system is the price level at which the copayments are set between 
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each tier.  They found that greater differences between tier-two and tier-three copay amounts 
were associated with greater decreases in utilization of non-preferred drugs (Roe et al.).  
 
Researchers at another PBM (AdvancePCS) looked at strategies for managing Cox-2 drugs 
(Celebrex, in particular), comparing four different cost-management approaches used by 
different client companies.  The study found three-tiered cost sharing to be the least effective 
approach (17 percent savings from what would have been paid otherwise).  The other approaches 
tested were step therapy (most effective), prior authorization (second), and a version of reference 
pricing (third).  This particular plan used a $7/$15/$25 set of copayments, with Celebrex priced 
at the $25 level (Tucker et al.). 
 
Two other peer-reviewed studies have examined the impact of three-tier copayments.  One, 
looking at implementation of new arrangements in one HMO, found that implementation of a 
three-tier copayment system may cause some shifting of medication costs to tier two 
medications.  Generic use increased by 6 to 8 percent, and the use of formulary brand-name 
products increased by 3 to 5 percent.  Non-formulary use appeared to decrease only for members 
who changed from a two-tier to a three-tier structure (Nair et al.).  Another peer-reviewed study, 
which examined the effect of three-tier cost sharing for those enrolled in retiree plans, found that 
higher copayments and three-tier models cut back on overall expenditures.  The cost burden, 
however, falls mainly on the consumer (Thomas et al.). 
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3d.  Four-Tiered or Other More Complex Copayment Structures 
 
Some payers have moved to four-tiered systems.  In the simplest case, the middle tier, which 
represents preferred brand-name drugs, is divided into two.  The first of these would include 
lower-cost preferred drugs or preferred drugs with better predicted outcomes.  The other would 
include higher-cost drugs or those with less certain outcomes.  In other applications, the fourth 
tier may be reserved for specialty drugs (e.g., self-administered injectable drugs or biotechnology 
treatments) or drugs needed for symptomatic relief.  In some cases, the fourth tier represents 
drugs where the consumer is required to pay the entire cost, perhaps at a discounted rate 
negotiated by the pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) or insurer.  According to one survey, 
approximately 3 percent of plans have moved to four-tier cost sharing, where the fourth tier may 
be used to increase enrollees’ sensitivity to the high cost of certain drugs or to drugs primarily 
intended for relief of symptoms for conditions that are unlikely to have life-threatening 
consequences (e.g., allergies or sexual dysfunction) (Kaiser/HRET). 
 
Because of increased costs for prescription drugs, Humana found that two-tier and three-tier 
systems were not extremely effective in curbing costs.  With the implementation of a four-tier 
system, Humana hopes to make its members more aware of the actual costs of prescription drugs 
by making out-of-pocket expenses closer to the price of the prescribed drug.  Humana’s goal is 
to curb the demand and current expenditure for expensive brand-name drugs (Perlstein). 
 
Some state prescription drug programs also utilize four and five-tiered copayment systems.  For 
instance, New York’s Elderly Pharmaceutical Insurance Coverage (EPIC) program recently 
reduced its tiered copayment structure from a five-tiered to a four-tiered system to prompt 
members to use generic drugs, instead of expensive brand-name drugs.  A report by the National 
Governors Association highlights that although multi-tiered copayments are often used in state 
pharmaceutical assistance programs, they contribute administrative complications, which in turn 
may restrict access to needed prescription drug therapies (NGA). 
          
Medco Health in 2002 stated it had more than 25 plans actively pursuing variations of the four-
tier formulary design.  For one client, it was testing a value-based program for a four-tier 
formulary.  Lower copayments were established for drugs used for more serious conditions.  
Thus proton pump inhibitors were placed in the second tier when prescribed for severe, erosive 
esophagitis; but they were in the third tier (with a higher copayment) when used for mild forms 
of heartburn.  Similarly, cholesterol-lowering drugs had a lower copayment when prescribed for 
patients with a high near-term risk for heart attack.  Medco generally projects savings of from 5 
to 10 percent or more when a plan moves to a four-tier formulary, but no peer-reviewed study 
has been published to date (Medco). 
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3e.  Coinsurance 
 
In contrast to copayment systems, where a flat dollar amount (or series of different amounts 
based on tiers) is established for a drug claim, a coinsurance system establishes a percentage of 
the allowed drug cost as the patient’s responsibility.  The Medicare Modernization Act 
established a coinsurance system for the new Medicare Part D benefit.  According to a 2003 
survey of employers, the percentage using coinsurance increased from 22 percent in 2001 to 30 
percent in 2003.  Some plans use coinsurance only for second-tier or third-tier drugs, while using 
a flay copayment for the generic drugs in the first tier.  In addition, some plans cap the amounts 
for the coinsurance-based cost sharing (PBMI). 
 
Tiered coinsurance rates are sometimes established for brands and generics or for preferred and 
non-preferred drugs.  The copayment and coinsurance approaches differ in that coinsurance 
amounts are automatically larger for more expensive drugs.  The Kaiser/HRET survey of 
employer health benefits found average coinsurance rates of 20 percent for generic drugs, 26 
percent for preferred drugs, and 31 percent for non-preferred drugs (Kaiser/HRET). 
 
One advantage for payers of a coinsurance approach over copayments is that it is designed to 
require that beneficiaries pay a higher share of more expensive drugs, thus making them aware of 
these higher costs and more interested in considering less costly alternatives.  Also, some plan 
managers choose this approach because coinsurance increases automatically as the cost of drugs 
increases.  This allows them to avoid adjusting cost sharing amounts upward over time, a step 
that leads to enrollee discontent. 
 
An issue with coinsurance is that it is likely to be based on a price that may not be the final 
transaction price.  Coinsurance is based on the retail transaction price before any rebates are 
taken into effect.  If the final amount paid is reduced by rebates or other considerations outside 
the retail transaction, then the beneficiary’s share of the payment is actually higher than the 
nominal coinsurance amount.  In addition, coinsurance may be less popular for patients because 
the amount owed is unpredictable.  However, an Express Scripts presentation asserts that there is 
no evidence that coinsurance, compared with a flat copay, provided any advantage in promoting 
greater use of generic drugs, greater use of less expensive brand drugs, or slowed growth in 
overall drug utilization (Motheral et al.). 
 
One pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) reported that nearly 40 percent of its clients had at least 
some members using coinsurance-based cost sharing (Medco Health).  It expected that more 
clients would adopt this approach in the years to follow.  They recommended that a typical 
coinsurance structure would charge 20 percent coinsurance for preferred drugs and 40 percent 
for non-preferred drugs. 
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3f.  Reference Pricing  
 
Reference pricing is a system that establishes a base price as a basis for reimbursement.  Any 
amount charged above the reference price is the responsibility of the individual user of the drug.  
In one common application, the reference price is set based on the cheapest drug among those 
competing within a particular class of drugs.  In other applications, one drug is selected out of a 
broader class of drugs for treating a particular condition, based on some combination of clinical 
and price considerations.  The selected drug – or any drug that is priced lower than the selected 
drug – is fully covered by insurance (or covered with a modest copayment).  The amount by 
which any other drug is more expensive is fully the responsibility of the patient.  The patient is 
thus exposed to the full price difference between the non-preferred drug and the selected drug. 
 
Use of reference pricing is not common in the United States, but in 2004, Wellpoint Health 
Networks introduced a reference pricing approach for some of its clients.  This plan has different 
levels of pharmacy benefits based on the average price of a drug within a specific class of drugs.  
Wellpoint asserts that this structure will give members more value, choice, and control in 
selecting and purchasing their prescriptions.  The plan has four copayment or coinsurance levels.  
Level 1 includes generic drugs that cost less than the reference price, level 2 includes brand-
name drugs that cost less than the reference price, level 3 includes generic or brand-name drugs 
that cost more than the reference price, and level 4 includes self-injectable drugs.  Members must 
take the plan’s prescription drug guide to their doctors in order to discuss which drug best meets 
their needs based on clinical need and cost (WellPoint Press Release).   
 
Although no estimates have been located for the use of reference pricing in the private sector, 
there is some evidence that it is being used as a payment basis for multi-source brand-name 
drugs where a generic is available.  Among employers, 38 percent required enrollees to pay the 
total difference in cost between the generic and the higher-priced brand-name drug, as opposed 
to simply charging a higher copayment (PBMI).  Similarly, some state Medicaid programs have 
used a reference pricing approach to encourage the use of generic drugs (Schwalberg et al.).  
According to the 2003 survey, 26 states pay only the generic rate for brand-name drugs, double 
the number of just three years earlier (Crowley et al.).  Even if the brand-name drug is dispensed, 
the state only pays the pharmacy the lower amount.  
 
There is little research looking at the use of reference pricing in the U.S. setting, in part because 
its use has not been extensive.  A peer-reviewed comparative study by researchers at one 
pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) looked at strategies for managing Cox-2 drugs (Celebrex, in 
particular), comparing four different approaches used by different client companies.  The study 
showed that reference pricing (referred to in this study as therapeutic buy-up) was the third most 
effective of the four (with savings of about 37 percent).  The other approaches tested were step 
therapy (most effective), prior authorization (second), and three-tier copayment (least effective) 
(Tucker et al.).  The authors acknowledge that a potential limitation of this study is that the plan 
adopting step therapy was the smallest of the four, making the estimate potentially less reliable. 
 
Reference pricing has been used more widely in other countries, including Germany, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Canada (British Columbia), Australia, and New Zealand.  Peer-
reviewed studies have looked at the introduction of reference pricing for several classes of drugs 
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in British Columbia.  One looked at reference pricing for ACE inhibitors (a common medication 
for hypertension).  Residents were fully covered for the least expensive ACE inhibitors up to a 
maximum amount per month.  In this particular application, the reference price was set at $27 
per month, without regard to the dosage, and those using other ACE inhibitors were responsible 
for any higher costs.  Exemptions were provided for frail elderly patients or for demonstrated 
failure of particular medications.  In the study, those who switched to the medication not subject 
to cost sharing were compared to those who continued use of their original ACE inhibitor.  The 
researchers found a steep decline in the use of higher-priced ACE inhibitors after implementation 
of the policy.  After a transition, the utilization rate for all ACE inhibitors was 11 percent below 
projected use rates, although overall use of anti-hypertensive drugs was unchanged.  They 
estimated savings of $6.7 million (Canadian) in one year’s expenditures (Schneeweiss et 
al./CMA Journal).  Older patients and low-income patients were more likely to switch 
medications.  In a second report from this same study, the researchers found little evidence that 
patients stopped treatments or that health care utilization or costs increased.  One issue raised by 
the authors is that there are fewer pharmacologic differences among the drugs in this particular 
class (Schneeweiss et al./NEJM).  A separate study looked at reference pricing for H2 
antagonists (a class of drugs used to treat ulcers).  This study found no worsening of health 
outcomes as a result of implementing reference pricing in British Columbia (Hazlet and Blough). 
 
More generally, economists have debated the appropriateness of reference pricing in the 
American setting, especially for Medicare.  Huskamp and her colleagues make a case for the use 
of reference pricing for Medicare, particularly in the context where a single entity (e.g., a PBM) 
administers the benefit in each geographic area.  Kanavos and Reinhardt find reference pricing 
consistent with efforts to offer a Medicare drug benefit in a competitive environment, although 
they emphasize the technical complexities and political sensitivities of implementing such an 
approach in the United States.  Danzon and Ketcham, by contrast, raise serious concerns about 
the implications of using reference pricing, pointing in particular to the potential deterrent effect 
on pharmaceutical research and development.  They argue that in drug classes where there is 
generic competition, reference pricing will drive prices and revenues down to the point that 
incentives to develop new drugs in that class will be significantly diminished.   
 
The Congressional Budget Office, in its review of design issues for a Medicare drug benefit, 
suggests that reference pricing may offer health plans the greatest opportunity to save money 
where generic versions of at least one drug in a therapeutic class are available.  The stiff 
competition among generic alternatives allows the plan or PBM to set a reference price based on 
these lower prices (CBO). 
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 4. Utilization Strategies: General Utilization Review Strategies 
 
General utilization review strategies address utilization in regard to overall prescribing patterns, 
taking into account the pattern of use for a particular beneficiary or total patterns of use for a 
particular physician.  These approaches are aimed at having the physician conduct a more 
general review of a set of prescriptions, as opposed to rejecting payment for a specific drug at the 
point of sale or taking specific steps to cause the substitution of one particular prescription. 
 
a. Retrospective drug utilization review 
b. Physician profiling  
c. Drug utilization review targeted to high-cost users  
d. Disease management  
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4a.  Retrospective Drug Utilization Review 
 
In general, drug utilization review (DUR) refers to any system for monitoring and managing use 
of drugs.  Generally, these programs determine patterns of drug utilization and costs and provide 
information in some form to payers, prescribers, and pharmacists with the goal of correcting 
problems.  Many such programs also establish some type of standards and then match utilization 
patterns against those standards.  Typically, programs are intended both to improve quality of 
medical care received and to manage costs by reducing inappropriate use of prescription drugs.  
Retrospective DUR can refer to any such program where the review is conducted sometime after 
the prescription as been filled – in contrast to concurrent DUR (section 1d), where a review 
occurs at the point of sale. 
 
In 2002, 60 percent of employers reported using retrospective DUR programs, slightly down 
from 69 percent in 2000 (PBMI/2003).  About twice as many (71 percent versus 31 percent) 
employers who managed their own benefits used retrospective DUR, compared to those that 
contracted out management to an outside vendor (PBMI/2002). 
 
By law, all state Medicaid programs are required to have DUR programs for outpatient drugs.  
Their purpose is to ensure that prescriptions are appropriate and are not likely to result in adverse 
medical outcomes.  The retrospective DUR program must review claims data to identify fraud, 
abuse, or inappropriate or medically unnecessary care among physician prescribing patterns.  
According to a 2003 survey, nearly all states (40 of 43 responding states) monitor trends in 
utilization, trends in cost (39 of 43), and drug costs per each individual drug (37 of 43).  A large 
majority of states also review drug costs on the basis of brand-name versus generic status (34 of 
43) and drug costs by condition (32 of 43) (Crowley et al.). 
 
Some DUR programs focus on the potential for abuse of certain drugs.  One Medicaid HMO 
identifies members who have 10 or more narcotic prescriptions written by three or more doctors 
and filled by three or more pharmacists in a three-month period.  These cases are reviewed to see 
if the high level of prescribing is appropriate (e.g., a patient with a catastrophic illness or one 
who is legitimately seeing several physicians).  If the use appears inappropriate, the patient is 
monitored and prescriptions are approved only if written by the patient’s primary care physician.  
The plan estimates that they have identified 250 patients misusing narcotics out of 90,000 
members in the plan.  Some disenrolled from the plan, while some others entered drug treatment 
programs (AAHP). 
 
Other programs focus more on patient safety issues.  For example, health plans described 
reviewing such combinations as asthma patients who are prescribed beta-blockers (which can 
exacerbate asthma symptoms), pregnant women who are prescribed medications known to have 
the potential to cause fetal abnormalities, or elderly patients who are prescribed medications with 
long-term effects that can increase the chance of falls (AAHP). 
 
Several peer-reviewed studies of DUR programs have examined programs in outpatient settings.  
Kreling, in a review of literature, identified two studies that have shown both quality and cost 
improvements (Kozma et al.; Kreling and Mott) and two others that have shown the impact of 
interventions targeted toward prescribers or pharmacists (Sleath et al.; Mott and Collins).  
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Another study, which failed to show an impact for prospective DUR programs, found that 
retrospective DUR programs in several Medicaid programs achieved their intended effects 
(Kidder and Bae). 
 
In 1995, Soumerai and Lipton critiqued the use of computer-based DUR programs, raising issues 
of questionable screening criteria, their failure to examine under-use of drugs, and the risks of 
denying prescribed drugs (more applicable to use of concurrent DUR).  A 2000 peer-reviewed 
study looked specifically at Medicaid DUR programs, finding average per-recipient savings of 
4.9 percent and average total drug savings of 6.9 percent.  No significant spillover effect was 
found for other health expenditures (Moore).  Another study of Medicaid DUR, published in 
2003, found no reduction in the rate of exceptions after implementing retrospective DUR, nor 
any effect on hospitalizations (Hennessy et al.). 
 
Overall, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) believe that retrospective DUR has the potential to 
save money.  One PBM (Caremark) projected savings of approximately 2 percent to 5 percent.  It 
also noted that the level of beneficiary outreach and education is minimal compared with other 
cost-containment mechanisms.   
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4b.  Physician Profiling 
 
Physicians profiling programs focus on the prescribing practices of individual physicians across 
many patients.  For example, a drug utilization review (DUR) program may identify particular 
physicians who prescribe fewer or more drugs than their peers.  Or they may identify how well 
individual physicians adhere to treatment guidelines.  In other cases, profiles may show drug-
specific variations, such as when a physician is prescribing a brand-name drug when most area 
doctors are prescribing the generic version. According to one pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), 
Caremark, potential savings associated with physician profiling is less than 2 percent. 
 
In these programs, physicians are provided feedback about their own overall prescribing patterns.  
For example, one health plan sends a quarterly report to top-prescribing physicians.  It identifies 
their top categories of drugs prescribed and potential alternatives that might be less expensive.  
The general expectation in profiling is that physicians prefer not to be out of line with their peers 
and will make adjustments, perhaps after seeking out new information about the use of a 
particular drug or class of drugs.  Even in the cases where penalties or mandatory responses are 
not included, physicians may follow up on information they receive and make changes in their 
prescribing patterns. 
 
The Arkansas Medicaid program has focused on polypharmacy in nursing homes for several 
years and has implemented a program of physician profiling.  Kansas is also in the process of 
developing a similar system (Henry et al.). 
 
A peer-reviewed article, published in 2002, reported on the use of profiling for the prescribing of 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs, a major class of antidepressants) in a staff-model 
managed-care organization.  The authors note that earlier research literature has shown only 
modest effects from the use of profiling, often finding that the cost of providing the feedback 
does not outweigh the cost of providing the feedback.  They also note that much of the profiling 
literature does not address specifically any impact on prescribing patterns.  The use of profiles in 
this case included both utilization and cost information, and academic detailing (section 5c) was 
provided for some of the clinics involved.  The result was a more rapid decrease in the market 
share for fluoxetine (marketed under the brand name Prozac) relative to other SSRIs than 
occurred nationally (a 50 percent drop compared to 31 percent nationally) for an estimated 
incremental savings of $0.61 per health plan member per year.  The authors note that the setting 
for this study was a staff-model HMO, which may have strengthened the message contained in 
the profiles and academic detailing (Yokoyama et al.). 
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4c.  Drug Utilization Review Targeted to High-Cost Users 
 
Spending for prescription drugs is not distributed uniformly across the population.  The rule of 
thumb for general health spending – that 20 percent of the population incurs about 80 percent of 
the costs – works roughly for drug spending overall.  An analysis of spending for 1996 showed 
that 20 percent of the population accounted for about 84 percent of all drug spending (DHHS).  
Approximately 2 percent of the population accounts for about one-third of all drug spending, 
while 5 percent of individuals account for a little over half of expenditures (DHHS; Fairman). 
 
Among those over 65, however, the picture is somewhat less extreme.  In this group, 20 percent 
of the population accounts for about 55 to 60 percent of spending (DHHS, AAA).  This less 
skewed distribution occurs because most seniors have drug claims, usually for a medication 
taken for a chronic condition and incurring costs for a year’s worth of medication. 
 
Drug utilization review can be targeted specifically to high users of prescription drugs.  A focus 
on high-cost users, especially those who are taking many different drugs (polypharmacy), has the 
potential for both cost savings and quality improvement.  Over 4 million older Americans take 
eight or more drugs; many of them could benefit from a review of their medications 
(AdvancePCS).  With multiple drugs in use simultaneously, the chances are greater that 
duplicative drugs are being used, and the odds of adverse drug reactions are greater.  Drug 
utilization programs can identify the highest users, allowing follow up by patients and 
physicians.  
 
For example, Elderplan, a not-for-profit social HMO that serves seniors in New York, has a 
program of identifying plan members with prescriptions for eight or more medications in a given 
three-month period.  They estimate that about 5 percent of their members meet this criterion.  For 
the members identified, the plan requests that the primary care physician review the patient’s 
drug list for appropriateness.  It further recommends that the patient bring in all medications at 
least once a year for a “brown bag” review.  The plan does not dictate any specific steps for 
changing medications, but depends on the primary care physician to take any necessary steps to 
reduce utilization and avoid unnecessary hospitalizations that could result from inappropriate use 
(Arp). 
 
Similarly, North Carolina’s primary care case management program has a program to manage 
drug use for nursing home beneficiaries.  The program identifies beneficiaries who take more 
than eight medications per month or who take certain high-cost drugs.  A team that includes both 
a physician and a pharmacist reviews these patients’ medications for potential polypharmacy 
problems, such as duplicative or inappropriate prescriptions.  The team makes recommendations 
to the prescribing physicians.  Preliminary findings indicate that medication changes are made 
for 37 percent of the patients and that benefits outweigh costs by a ratio of 13 to 1.  Savings were 
estimated as 4.2 percent of patient drug costs (Henry et al.). 
 
A commercial health plan has a program that identifies all elderly patients with 20 or more 
prescriptions in a given quarter for chronic or high-risk conditions.  Once patients are identified, 
their physicians receive reports with complete information about their medications and are asked 
to review the medication history to prevent adverse drug interactions (AAHP). 
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4d.  Disease Management 
 
Disease management programs generally try to lower the cost of certain chronic conditions 
through reduced emergency room visits, fewer hospitalizations, and better choices of drugs.  
Under these programs, health plans identify individuals as having a particular disease or health 
condition and as potentially high users of health care.  Disease management programs may apply 
outcomes principles or population-based approaches to identify persons at risk.  These 
individuals, whose diseases are expected to be amenable to management, are provided with 
additional resources and information about their condition and monitored more carefully 
(Epstein).  Key goals are to maximize the effectiveness of drug therapy and minimize the total 
treatment costs for the disease.  Some view disease management programs as a “win-win” 
situation.  Patients learn more about their disease and how to control it, while the payer reaps the 
rewards in terms of reduced costs.  But a key issue is whether it always reduces costs.  
 
Use of disease management is growing.  The number of firms reporting that they offer disease 
management programs to their employees has risen from 14 percent in 1995 to 53 percent in 
2002 (PBMI).  In Medicaid, 10 states reported a disease management program in 2001 
(Schwalberg et al.), and a 2003 study identified 13 states with operational programs (Henry et 
al.).  Most commonly, they cover diabetes and asthma, but a number of other diseases are 
included as well.  
 
For example, the Virginia Health Outcomes Partnership targets asthma by training both 
pharmacists and prescribers and identifying patients who are good candidates for intervention.  
The result, according to a peer-reviewed evaluation, was a 41 percent reduction in emergency 
room visits for patients of the participating physicians who received feedback reports.  At the 
same time, these patients experienced a 25 percent increase in dispensing recommended asthma 
drugs.  A cost-effectiveness analysis showed direct savings to Medicaid of $3 to $4 for every 
dollar invested in the program.  After this initial success, the program was expanded to address 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, depression, diabetes, gastrointestinal diseases, 
hypertension, and congestive heart failure (Rossiter et al.). 
 
In Washington’s Medicaid program, disease management programs were contracted to outside 
vendors.  One program, operated by McKesson, enrolled a total of about 15,000 patients with 
diabetes, asthma, or congestive heart failure.  Nurse care coordinators maintain regular contact 
with the patients, advising them on medication management among other things.  An evaluation 
of this program is under way (Henry et al.). 
 
In another example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee has a program to manage patients with 
hepatitis C.  It pays for a genotype test (costing $300) to determine which patients need a 24-
week regimen and which need a 48-week regimen of interferon with ribavirin.  Previously many 
physicians simply prescribed the 48-week regimen.  Based on the test results, some patients can 
avoid the side effects of the additional weeks of therapy, while the plan estimated savings of $1.9 
million in reduced cost of medication (NGA). 
 
One Medicare+Choice plan has tested a predictive modeling approach to identify patients where 
drug therapy is best able to help avoid negative outcomes.  The program initially targeted 
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osteoarthritis and congestive heart failure.  A pharmacist calls patients who are identified, and 
counsels them on appropriate drug therapies and provides other advice about their disease.  It 
includes nine months of intervention and nine more months of follow-up and outcome 
measurement. 
 
The ability to achieve savings under disease management has been difficult to document.  In 
part, this is because the comprehensive approach may trade increased spending in one category 
for savings in another.  For example, in the Virginia program, more use of drugs was encouraged 
to reduce use of other health care services.  Increased drug compliance may often be a key goal 
in disease management.  The therapeutic enhancements offered by new drugs may be 
emphasized, thus increasing the use of these drugs.  Critics argue that some programs, especially 
those sponsored by vendors in the pharmaceutical industry, amount to simply efforts to increase 
use of certain drugs or that they emphasize a single disease at the expense of attention to multiple 
comorbidities.   
 
There appear to be few systematic research studies in the literature.  In part, this reflects the 
challenge of measuring the results, for example, whether to compare spending for disease 
management enrollees with a baseline calculated from prior-year spending versus one calculated 
from non-participants.  Other factors are assessing the long-term effects of measures such as 
educating providers and patients or sorting out the effect of multiple components implemented 
simultaneously (Kreling; Wheatley).  Vendors of these programs increasingly emphasize 
enhanced quality rather than savings as the argument for adopting their programs.   
 
In addition to the peer-reviewed study of the Virginia program, noted above, another peer-
reviewed article illustrates the difficulties.  Researchers reported on a program to manage 
patients with congestive heart failure.  That nurse-directed multidisciplinary program reduced 
hospital days by 36 percent and readmissions by 44 percent for targeted patients.  The study did 
not look specifically at changes in drug costs, but the authors did report that the targeted patients 
were in greater compliance with their prescribed medications (Rich et al.).   
 
Finally, another study shows promising results, but conclusions are limited in a non-randomized 
study without a control group.  It examined a program where diabetics covered by self-insured 
employers’ health plans received community-based pharmaceutical care services.  The services 
included education by certified diabetes educators, long-term community pharmacist follow-up, 
clinical assessment, goal setting, monitoring, and collaborative drug therapy management with 
physicians.  Enrollees’ health improved over time while mean medical costs declined for 
employers (Cranor et al.). 
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 5. Utilization Strategies: Education Approaches 
 
Some utilization strategies are aimed at a broader educational approach as opposed to the more 
coercive approach represented by some of the other categories.  The overall idea is that more 
information in the hands of physicians, pharmacists, or patients may lead to different (and maybe 
less expensive) patterns of prescribing. 
 
a. Education of consumers and physicians on the benefits of generic drugs 
b. Education of consumers and physicians on the appropriate use of particular drugs 
c. Counter detailing or academic detailing 
d. Development of unbiased information on the appropriate use of certain drugs 
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5a.  Education of Consumers and Physicians on the Benefits of Generic Drugs  
 
Among the various approaches to encouraging greater use of generic drugs, education strategies 
are the least intrusive.  Health plans or the pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) with which they 
contract can create a program to provide more information on the benefits of prescribing generic 
drugs.  In some cases, these programs are targeted to consumers; in others, they are targeted to 
physicians.  Campaigns may include broad-based media campaigns, signs or other information 
provided through pharmacies, direct communications with consumers or physicians, or providing 
samples to physicians. 
 
The potential effect on drug costs is substantial.  According to one study commissioned for 
Medco Health, 90 percent of patients said they would take a generic drug if it were prescribed, 
but only half said they remembered that their physician had talked to them about generics 
(Medco).  A report prepared for the Generic Pharmaceutical Association found potential savings 
of 16.3 percent per individual (for seniors and disabled Medicare beneficiaries) if all benefit 
administrators achieved the same generic use rate now obtained in the private plans that achieve 
the best results (Ritter et al.).  Finally, a 2003 peer-reviewed study found potential savings of 6.1 
percent for Medicaid spending on drugs for which both generic and brand-name forms were 
available.  Overall savings to Medicaid drug costs were estimated at 1.1 percent.  Those savings 
grew to 11.9 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively, if all states adopted the best price available 
for generic drugs across states (Fischer and Avorn). 
 
Some evidence also suggests that physicians hold some misconceptions about generic drugs.  
Physicians sometimes believe that pharmacists substitute generic drugs to maximize their profits, 
and some also believe that generic drug manufacturers may not have to meet the same quality 
standards as brand-name manufacturers.  Although there has been some controversy over the use 
of certain generic drugs, it seems clear that a better understanding by physicians has the potential 
to make a difference (Banahan and Kolassa; Murphy). 
 
Several large-scale education campaigns on the use of generic drugs have been undertaken 
recently.  Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) has conducted an extensive campaign 
to increase awareness of generic drugs.  The plan (“Generic Drugs: The Unadvertised Brand”) 
estimated before starting the campaign that members used generic drugs 85 percent of the time 
when such a drug is available.  The campaign included mailing coupons to members to cover the 
copay for a generic drug, a series of consumer awareness advertisements in newspapers and 
business journals to dispel myths about generic drugs, and a competition among pharmacies to 
increase the dispensing rate on generics.  The plan invested $1 million in the advertisements and 
worked on them in partnership with the Michigan Pharmacists Association.  The competition 
among pharmacies saved BCBSM an estimated $13 million in reduced drug costs.  They assume 
even greater savings for consumers, since the campaign will affect use of generics for consumers 
who are not plan members (BCBSM). 
 
One large PBM, Medco, launched a program known as Generics First in 2000.  Several health 
plans worked with Medco to send letters to providers offering to provide samples of selected 
generic drugs.  Typically, the physicians ordered free samples from four commonly used generic 
drug categories: anti-hypertension drugs, anti-depressants, gastrointestinal agents, and non-
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steroidal anti-inflammatory medications.  Medco reported that various actions — including 
access to generic samples, face-to-face clinical discussions, and use of patient education 
materials — increased generic dispensing rates by 7.1 percentage points, from about 38 percent 
to about 45 percent.  Among physicians who receive clinical pharmacist visits and have access to 
generic samples, the campaign generated a 22 percent increase in generic prescribing rates.  
Medco has also focused on increasing the dispensing of generic drugs in its mail-order programs.  
It contacts those physicians who write many “dispense as written” prescriptions to ask them to 
consider prescribing more generic drugs.  Medco reports that nine of ten physicians contacted 
make some changes from brand-name drugs to generic drugs (Medco).  
 
In another variation, a Pennsylvania health plan promotee the use of generic drugs by offering 
incentive payments to medical practices that use generics.  They also send reports to show 
doctors how they compare with their peers in prescribing patterns for generic drugs. 
 
In 2003, several large California health plans launched a program called Generic Advantage, 
which used mailings to encourage physicians to discuss with patients the potential use of generic 
substitutes for drugs used to treat arthritis pain, acid reflux, diabetes, depression, hypertension, 
and high cholesterol.  Physicians can make “$10 off” coupons available to patients, an amount 
that often has the effect of eliminating the copayment for that prescription (Levin). 
 
One peer-reviewed study looked at a modest program of physician education at an urban public 
hospital and its satellite clinics.  That study included both an educational session with clinic 
directors and a form that asked the physician to document that at least two generic non-steroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) had been tried before prescribing a brand-name NSAID.  The 
absence of a form, however, did not prevent dispensing of the drug.  The results of this small 
study was a drop in the rate of prescribing brand-name NSAIDs from 10.5 percent to 6.9 percent, 
with higher savings where house staff were supervised by attending physicians compared to 
prescriptions written by community-based primary care physicians (Ahluwalia et al.). 
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5b.  Education of Consumers and Physicians on the Appropriate Use of Particular Drugs 
 
Purchasers or health plans may use educational strategies to make both physicians and 
consumers more aware of the availability of alternative therapies or less expensive drugs that are 
included in a health plan’s formulary.  Advocates of this approach believe that better availability 
of information will generally encourage consumers to take more responsibility for their drug use 
and encourage the selection of the least costly alternatives.  Increasingly, this option relies on 
Internet strategies for making information available in a continuously updated form.  Some plans 
have found that older plan members – although less likely to use the Internet – are generally 
more knowledgeable about their benefits and more likely to pay attention to educational 
programs. 
  
In some cases, plans have taken on broad goals, such as promoting appropriate use of antibiotics 
or encouraging appropriate treatment for certain conditions.  In other cases, plans or the 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) with which they contract have created programs to educate 
physicians and consumers about their formularies.  These programs may include sending a 
formulary list to network physicians on an annual basis and making it available through the 
Internet.  In some cases, they may arrange for pharmacists to visit with physicians to discuss the 
formulary or send mailing with specific information about the drugs on the formulary.  Some 
plans organize meetings for enrollees to tell them about the formularies and changes to them.  
Plans may also target mailings for specific situations, such as when an enrollee is approaching a 
cap on their benefit.  They may also in this situation set up sessions to counsel enrollees on the 
availability of more cost-effective drugs (Draper et al.).  According to a 2001 report sponsored 
by the California Health Care Foundation, continuing medical education and academic detailing 
may positively counter the influences of DTC advertising and information from pharmaceutical 
representatives on physician prescribing practices, thus decreasing spending on expensive brand-
name drugs (Protocare Sciences). 
 
Humana has used an online prescription drug management features for its Medicare+Choice 
plans.  It provides both patient-specific information in a secure portion of the website and general 
information in a public portion of the site.  In the secure portion, members can get access to a 24-
month history of their pharmacy claims and can find out if a drug is covered (Draper et al.). 
 
Most private health plans have put at least some information on the Internet.  A typical plan may 
allow enrollees to look at the plan formulary, locate participating pharmacies, and order refills 
for mail delivery.  An increasing number of plans have introduced pilot programs for physicians 
to use hand-held electronic devices to get information about which drugs are on a formulary, 
verify coverage of a particular drug, learn about cost sharing amounts, and identify dosing 
precautions and drug interactions.  In some cases, these capabilities are combined with the ability 
to enter the prescription electronically (Draper et al.; AAHP).  There are several identified 
limitations to handheld electronic prescribing devices.  Some are unreliable, slow, and can be 
more time consuming for patients with multiple diagnoses.  Overall, use of such devices has not 
been proven to reduce the amount of medication errors (Lipton). 
 
Another example is focused specifically on educating the physician.  The Fallon Community 
Health Plan makes available guidelines for anti-coagulant management to address the risks 
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associated with drugs to prevent blood clotting.  Significant risks are associated with dosages 
that are either too high or too low.  The plan, which has implemented a computerized flow chart 
incorporating its recommendations and uses the system to provide multiple cycles of feedback, 
reports improved results in major measures of performance (AAHP).  
 
Similarly, PacifiCare of Arizona-Nevada claims that its combination of academic detailing and 
provider education has worked best in curbing unnecessary prescription drug utilization.  This 
strategy helps improve formulary compliance and physician consideration of both cost and 
clinical effectiveness of a specific drug therapy (Darves).   
 
A program for physician education in the proper treatment of otitis media was evaluated in a 
2002 peer-reviewed article.  Physicians were offered a continuing medical education program on 
distinguishing between acute otitis media (AOM) and otitis media with effusion (OME) and 
presenting consensus recommendations that antibiotics be used for the former, but deferred for 
the latter.  Exposure to the education program increased diagnoses for OME and reduced the 
number of prescriptions written – with a resulting reduction in drug costs (Pichichero). 
 
Another peer-reviewed study focused on the use of histamine-2-receptor antagonists (drugs, also 
known as H2 blockers, used to treat ulcers and gastric reflux) based on a program at one health 
plan that combined physician education, therapeutic reevaluation of eligible patients, and 
feedback to the physicians.  The result was a substantial increase in the use of the preferred 
drugs, with the annual savings for the health plan exceeding by a wide margin its cost of 
implementing the program.  There was no effect on hospitalizations.  The effects were much 
greater for physicians employed in the health centers (staff model) compared to independent 
physicians under contract with the plan (Brufsky et al.). 
 
A different education approach is to increase physicians’ knowledge of the cost of different 
drugs.  The idea is that, armed with such knowledge, physicians might be more willing to 
consider costs when writing prescriptions.  One study, published in 2003 and based at four 
teaching hospitals, made available to physicians an interactive teaching conference and a pocket 
guide that listed the average wholesale prices of over 100 commonly prescribed medications.  
Over half the physicians consulted the guide and rated it at least moderately useful.  The result 
was a modest increase in physicians’ reported awareness of drug costs and concern about the 
cost of the drugs they prescribed (Korn et al.). 
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5c.  Counter Detailing or Academic Detailing  
 
Counter detailing, also known as academic detailing, refers to providing alternative information 
to that provided to physicians by the pharmaceutical manufacturers.  Drug company educational 
strategies (known as detailing) provide drug samples and information about the value of a 
particular drug marketed by that company with the goal of increasing awareness and use of that 
drug.  In counter detailing, groups such as insurers or purchasers – or groups affiliated with them 
– can provide alternative messages.  For example, they may share with physicians studies 
showing that a much-advertised brand-name drug is no more effective than a less expensive, 
older alternative.  
 
An example of this practice is a decision by Massachusetts Medicaid to target a counter-detailing 
program at physicians who prescribed as many as six psychiatric drugs in the same therapeutic 
class.  If these physicians did not change their practices within three months of receiving letters 
on the subject, they got visits from state-employed pharmacists to discuss their prescribing 
behavior.  The state’s goal was to save $10 million a year from this effort, representing about 2 
percent of total spending on psychiatric drugs (Business News of the Week). 
 
Counter detailing may be especially valuable if efforts are focused on medical conditions where 
the purchaser believes that the alternative treatments are equally effective.  A peer-reviewed 
study of a counter-detailing DUR educational program in Canada found that it was both effective 
in improving prescribing rates and widely accepted by medical professionals.  However, 
prescribing rate changes and economic impacts differed by therapeutic category (Farris et al.).  
One potential source of differences is whether the alternative treatment is available as a multi-
source drug.  Drug companies may no longer be able to justify the cost of detailing on behalf of 
these less profitable drugs, making it easier for the counter-detailing program to be effective. 
 
In a 1983 peer-reviewed study, researchers implemented an office-based physician education 
program to reduce excessive use of three drug groups.  Prescribers were identified through 
Medicaid records, and one group was offered educational visits by clinical pharmacists together 
with mailings about the target drugs.  Compared with a control group, these doctors reduced 
prescriptions of the target drugs by 14 percent, resulting in significant cost savings.  No change 
was seen for a group of doctors who only received the mailings (Avorn and Soumerai).  The 
changes in prescribing persisted for at least nine months after the intervention began.  In a 
follow-up paper, they estimated potential savings to Medicaid (Soumerai and Avorn). 
 
In study published in 2002, academic detailing was used in concert with physician profiling in a 
Texas staff-model managed-care organization.  The result of the combined strategy was a 
decrease in the use of fluoxetine (Prozac) compared to the use of other selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors for the treatment of depression.  On top of a national trend toward less use of 
fluoxetine, use by physicians in this plan declined more rapidly, leading to annual savings of 
about $0.61 per member (Yokoyama et al.). 
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5d.  Development of Unbiased Information on the Appropriate Use of Certain Drugs 
 
One cost containment strategy is to encourage the development of information on the appropriate 
use of certain drugs.  This strategy is similar to counter detailing (section 5c), which focuses on 
the dissemination to physicians of accurate information about drugs.  The development of 
unbiased information is a strategy that could be initiated by a single purchaser, but is more likely 
undertaken by a coalition of purchasers or by the government on behalf of all purchasers. 
 
A number of experts have called for increased efforts to develop unbiased information on the 
cost-effectiveness of various drugs.  A growing number of managed care organizations are 
implementing the evidence-based and value-based formulary guidelines issued by the Academy 
of Managed Care Pharmacy.  These guidelines urge organizations to request from drug 
companies a standardized “dossier” that provides information of a drug’s effectiveness and 
safety and also on its economic value relative to alternative therapies (Neumann).  
 
Because the Food and Drug Administration to date has scrupulously avoided looking at cost 
factors, that agency does not develop such information.  Other federal agencies have also tended 
to proceed cautiously with this line of research because of the potential political fallout if they 
get too close to making recommendations favoring one treatment or one drug over another.  
Some have suggested that an independent body, answering neither to government nor industry, 
could best accomplish this goal (Reinhardt). 
 
A significant initiative in this area comes from the state of Oregon (Oregon Health Resources 
Commission; Santa).  In 2001, the legislature directed the state’s Department of Human Services 
to look at the effectiveness and relative cost of different drugs.  The state contracted with the 
Oregon Health and Science University to conduct evidence-based reviews of published and 
unpublished studies on drugs in four therapeutic classes: gastrointestinal medications, two types 
of pain medications, and cholesterol-lowering drugs.  Oregon then uses these reviews as input 
into a process by which a public committee (created by the Oregon Health Resources 
Commission) draws conclusions, for example, about whether there are differences in efficacy or 
safety among different COX-2 inhibitors (e.g., Celebrex and Vioxx) or whether there are 
differences between those drugs and other non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs).  In 
these particular cases, the committee concluded that evidence comparing Celebrex and Vioxx 
was inconsistent and inconclusive and that evidence does not demonstrate any difference in 
efficacy among drugs in the larger class of NSAIDs.  The state then has the option of deciding 
whether to use this information to place certain drugs on the Medicaid program’s preferred drug 
list.  Information developed through this process is available to both health care professionals 
and consumers.  In fact, AARP has developed summary consumer guides based on the Oregon 
Commission’s work (Douma).   
 
Oregon is one of several states that proceeded with separate procedures for reviewing the 
literature on drug effectiveness for particular classes of drugs.  Some have suggested that this 
time-consuming process is one that may be best executed if states pooled their resources to 
create one review that could then be applied to specific state programs.  A group of states, led by 
Oregon, have initiated the Drug Effectiveness Review Project to attempt such collaboration. 
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A study published in 2004 of early experience with the Oregon preferred drug list reported 
stakeholder support for the state’s approach, including the finding that use of the academic 
evidence-based reviews enhanced the credibility of the program.  Manufacturers, however, were 
not happy with the decision to use price as a criterion when the evidence suggested that none of 
the drugs in a class was more effective.  Savings targets had generally not been achieved in the 
brief period being studied, but it may be that the effect of profiling, education, and similar 
strategies will take longer to have an effect (Bernasek et al.). 
 
In another evidence-based study, findings from the Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering 
Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT) — a clinical study supported by the 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute — found that thiazide-type diuretics should be the first 
step in treatment for hypertension ahead of more expensive drug therapies such as ACE-
inhibitors.  A subsequent study tracked physician prescribing patterns in the four months 
following the release of the ALLHAT study.  The study showed that published findings 
significantly influenced prescribing practices in favor of the less-expensive antihypertensive drug 
therapy.  This suggests that physicians may be influenced by clinical evidence despite the cost or 
brand name of a particular drug (Austin et al.).  
 
Fischer and Avorn, in a 2004 peer-reviewed study, looked at the potential cost savings for health 
care payers if there was increased adherence to evidence-based recommendations such as those 
from the ALLHAT study.  This study looked at 133,624 elderly enrollees in a large state 
pharmaceutical assistance program, who were being treated for hypertension in 2001.  These 
patients filled more than 2 million prescriptions at an annual program cost of $48.5 million.  The 
authors found that over 40 percent of the 2 million prescriptions had an alternative regimen that 
appeared more appropriate according to evidence-based recommendations.  Such changes would 
have reduced the costs to payers in 2001 by $11.6 million.  Adherence to evidence-based 
prescribing guidelines for hypertension could result in substantial savings (about $1.2 billion 
nationally) in prescription drug costs for the elderly (Fischer and Avorn).   
 
Another peer-reviewed study, published in 2003, concluded that income influenced the use of 
evidence-based medication by older persons with diabetes who were enrolled in a 
Medicare+Choice plan in Los Angeles County.  Overall, there were lower utilization rates of all 
evidence-based therapies for Medicare managed care enrollees with incomes less than $20,000 a 
year (Brown et al.). 
 
Literature 
 
Austin, Peter C., et al., “Changes in Prescribing Patterns Following Publication of the ALLHAT Trial,” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 291(1): 44-45, January 7, 2004. 
 
Bernasek, Cathy, et al., Oregon’s Medicaid PDL: Will an Evidence-Based Formulary with Voluntary 
Compliance Set a Precedent for Medicaid?  Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 
January 2004. 
 
Brown, Arleen F., et al., “Income-Related Differences in the Use of Evidence-Based Therapies in Older 
Persons with Diabetes Mellitus in For-Profit Managed Care,” Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society 51(5): 665-70, May 2003. 
  
Page 78
 
Douma, Allen, “Your Guide to Choosing a Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Medication,” AARP, 
http://www.aarp.org/or/rx/Articles/a2003-09-24-or-rx-consumerguides-arthritis.html  (10 
November 2003). 
 
Fischer, Michael A., and Jerry Avorn, “Economic Implications of Evidence-Based Prescribing for 
Hypertension,” Journal of the American Medical Association 291(15): 1850-1856, April 21, 
2004. 
 
Neumann, Peter J., “Evidence-Based and Value-Based Formulary Guidelines,” Health Affairs 23(1): 124-
34, January/February 2004. 
 
Oregon Health Resources Commission, “Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs),” 
Subcommittee Report, Update #1, August 2003. 
 
Reforming States Group, “State Initiatives on Prescription Drugs: Creating a More Functional Market,” 
Health Affairs 22(4): 128-136, July/August 2003. 
 
Reinhardt, Uwe E., “Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Health Affairs 20(5): 136-149, 
September/October 2001. 
 
Santa, John, “The Evidence Based Process Applied to Prescription Drugs in Oregon,” Oregon Office of 
Health Policy and Research, background paper for the State Coverage Initiatives workshop, 
Chicago, July 18-19, 2002, www.statecoverage.net/pdf/santa2.pdf (14 October 2003). 
  
Page 79
6. Pricing strategies: Pricing Approaches Available to All Payers 
 
These pricing strategies aim at lowering the price paid for drugs, rather than modifying the 
utilization of drugs.  Some focus on the price itself, while other focus on rebates, dispensing fees, 
or other elements of the overall pricing system. 
 
a. Use of purchasing pools  
b. Higher rebates through market leverage 
c. Requirements to make prices and rebates transparent 
d. Lower dispensing fees to the pharmacy  
e. Use of restricted pharmacy networks 
f. Use of discount cards  
g. Defined contribution approaches 
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6a. Use of Purchasing Pools 
 
Some organizations have chosen to band together and form purchasing pools.  Under these 
arrangements, organizations aim to increase their purchasing power through higher volume and 
shared expertise. 
 
At the federal level, the U.S. Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) have 
worked together to achieve larger discounts.  In 2002, the two agencies spent about $4.7 billion 
on drugs.  They contract jointly to purchase certain drugs from manufacturers, with estimated 
annual savings of $170 million per year.  A study by the Congressional Commission on Service 
Members and Veterans Transition Assistance in 1999 recommended that the VA and DOD 
conduct joint procurement of all drugs and use a single clinically based formulary.  The 
Congressional Budget Office, in its March 2003 budget options report, said that these initiatives 
would save about $600 million over five years and $1.7 billion over ten years (CBO).  
 
Some states have formed purchasing pools for different programs they operate.  For example, 
Massachusetts, in 2000, created a program to combine various programs (senior pharmacy 
assistance program, Medicaid enrollees, state workers, uninsured and under-insured individuals) 
into a single purchasing pool.  Georgia implemented a program, starting in 2000, to combine 
management of its drug benefit for Medicaid, state employees, and other public programs.  The 
program covers about 2 million state residents.  Through use of a single pharmacy benefit 
manager (PBM) and a single preferred drug list, Georgia reduced its pharmacy cost growth trend 
from 26 percent in FY 2001 to 16 percent in FY 2002.  Alabama, California, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, and Washington are among the other states that 
have set in motion cross-agency purchasing programs, some of which explicitly exclude 
Medicaid (NCSL; NGA; Silow-Carroll and Alteras).   
 
A variety of efforts are also under way to combine efforts across states to get better drug prices.  
West Virginia, working with four other states (Delaware, Missouri, New Mexico, and Ohio) 
through RXIS (Rx Issuing States), entered into a contract with Express Scripts in July 2002 to 
manage their drug benefits jointly for state employees and certain other state programs 
(excluding Medicaid).  RXIS uses preferred drug lists and rebate negotiations to lower the cost of 
prescription drugs through combined market power of about 700,000 lives.  West Virginia 
realized net savings of $7 million in the first year and estimates it will save $25 million (5 
percent of costs) over three years by being a part of this common effort (NCSL; Silow-Carroll 
and Alteras). 
 
The National Medicaid Pooling Initiative was created by Michigan to operate as a multi-state 
pool, with participation initially by Medicaid programs Alaska, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont (joined later by Hawaii and Minnesota).  The pool negotiates a matrix 
of prices and rebates based on the number of pool participants and the exclusivity offered for a 
particular drug in each state.  Each state establishes its own separate contract with the common 
PBM and makes its own decisions about preferred drugs.  In April 2004, DHHS approved this 
purchasing pool for a total of over 900,000 persons with Medicaid.  With this approval, the states 
estimated the following savings for 2004: Michigan, $8 million; Vermont, $1 million; Nevada, 
$1.9 million; Alaska $1 million; New Hampshire $250,000; and Minnesota $11 million – 
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amounts that may represent savings of 25 to 50 percent beyond levels obtained previously with 
individual preferred drug lists (NCSL; DHHS; Silow-Carroll and Alteras). 
 
There are other multi-state initiatives as well.  The National Legislative Association on 
Prescription Drug Prices, with nine states (Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont) and the District of Columbia, is 
working with the Heinz Family Philanthropies to explore options for a common PBM.  The 
Minnesota Multistate Contracting Alliance for Pharmacy (with 41 participating states) is seeking 
to standardize and consolidate state requirements for pharmaceuticals, supplies, and services, and 
to develop cooperative contracts.  The program reports average savings of 23.7 percent below the 
published average wholesale price (AWP) for brand-name drugs and 65 percent below AWP for 
generics (NCSL; NGA). 
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6b.  Higher Rebates Through Market Leverage 
 
Typically, price discounts in the form of rebates are provided by the manufacturer to public or 
private health plans or their contracted pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) based on the quantity 
of the manufacturer’s drugs purchased by plan enrollees over a designated period of time.  As a 
cost-containment strategy, higher rebates have the potential to lower the net price paid per 
prescription.  PBMs and health plans may use various strategies to obtain higher rebates.  
Mostly, these involve measures to increase compliance with a formulary. 
 
Under the common arrangement where the plan or PBM does not actually take possession of the 
drugs, rebates are paid directly to the plan or PBM often on a quarterly basis.  Specific 
information on rebate agreements and rebate amounts are generally viewed as proprietary 
information, and they may be based on total sales of a specific drug by a plan’s enrollees or on 
the market share of that drug compared to other drugs in a therapeutic class.  In some cases, they 
are based on changes in the share of drugs, rather than the absolute share.  Rebates may also be 
based on inclusion of a drug on a restrictive formulary.  Because of the nature of this market, 
more generous rebates are likely to be available for drugs that treat conditions for which an 
alternative brand-name treatment is available.  They are less likely to be offered for a new or 
breakthrough drug, for generic drugs, or for brand-name drugs when generics have been 
available for a long period of time. 
 
Rebate negotiations with manufacturers may be based on the overall business a plan or PBM 
does with the company, rather than a separate negotiation for each line of business.  Some rebate 
negotiations are based on an individual drug, while others may be based on a set of drugs 
produced by the same manufacturer.  There is some sense that manufacturers prefer to negotiate 
on a bundle of drugs, using their breakthrough drugs as leverage to get others on formularies, 
while plans prefer a drug-by-drug negotiation (Draper et al.).   
 
Industry analysts cite some evidence that PBMs may receive non-cash benefits from 
manufacturers or cash rebates that are not tied to a particular drug (DHHS).  These may be based 
on agreements about the content of communications to physicians from the PBMs about 
particular drugs, or plans that operate their own pharmacies or mail-order operations may receive 
additional price discounts there.  Also, some experts have suggested that PBMs may receive 
support for disease management or research programs in lieu of rebates. 
 
PBMs vary in how they treat rebates in contracts with health plan or purchaser clients.  Some 
PBMs pass rebates on to their client and get their revenue through an additional fee (sometimes 
called an administrative rebate) from the manufacturer.  Other PBMs divide the rebate between 
themselves and the client.  In other cases, negotiations occur separately between the PBM and 
the manufacturer and between the PBM and the client, with the PBM keeping the net difference 
between the negotiated net prices (Health Policy Alternatives).  According to a 2003 survey, 
about equal numbers of employers receive rebates as a percentage of all rebates collected versus 
a guaranteed dollar amount per prescription.  But the trend has been toward the guaranteed dollar 
amount (PBMI). 
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Average savings achieved through rebates are hard to determine because they are viewed as 
proprietary.  One study by the GAO of plans participating in the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program (FEHBP) estimated that Blue Cross Blue Shield achieved an average discount 
of 5 to 6 percent in rebates from manufacturers.  Through the use of formularies, PBMs 
encourage doctors and patients to use preferred drugs, which in turn allows PBMs to receive 
rebates from specified manufacturers.  The FEHBP plans that used these PBMs received $113 
million collectively from manufacturer rebates, which accounted for 2 to 21 percent of total 
savings achieved through formulary use (GAO).  Industry representatives report that rebate 
savings can be much higher (35 percent) on selected drugs.  HCFA’s Office of the Actuary, in 
estimating net 1997 private insurer drug expenditures for the National Health Expenditure series, 
assumed average rebates from manufacturers in the range of 7 percent. 
 
Some have argued that rebates, while lowering the price for specific favored drugs, may fail to 
contain overall costs by encouraging the use of more expensive brand-name drugs.  PBMs 
traditionally look to rebates as an important source of income, which is not always shared fully 
with their clients.  Because rebates are typically unavailable for generic drugs or older brand-
name drugs, some believe that PBMs are more likely to include the more expensive brand-name 
drugs on their formularies because these drugs generate rebates for the PBM.   
 
Consultants typically advise purchasers that they should have a method for forecasting and 
auditing the rebates they receive from PBMs, since errors leading to incomplete collections are 
not uncommon.  They also suggest that purchasers seek a guaranteed rebate amount in their 
contracts and remain actively involve in the formulary decisions that often drive rebate amounts.  
In some cases, purchasers maintain control over what drugs are on the formulary (Nee; Tauber).  
According to a 2003 article, some managed-care organizations are moving to manage their drug 
rebate processes in-house because it affords them a higher level of control over the drug 
utilization of their plan enrollees, improves collection of rebate payments, and avoids the need to 
share rebates with the PBM (Drug Cost Management Report).  One PBM (Express Scripts) has 
even moved to stop accepting rebates from manufacturers for promoting specific products to 
physician and patients, although it would continue to accept rebates for increasing drugs sales 
and market share (Drug Benefit Trends). 
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6c.  Requirements to Make Prices and Rebates Transparent 
 
Among the key components of an efficient market is complete information on product quality 
and price.  The U.S. market for prescription drugs generally fails to meet this market condition, 
since complete information on drug prices is unavailable.  In particular, manufacturers and their 
customers view the specific information on rebate agreements and rebate amounts as proprietary.   
 
This absence of price information limits the ability of purchasers (whether public programs or 
private firms) to ensure that they are getting the best price for drugs.  In particular, purchasers 
may be uncertain whether pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) choose particular drugs for 
formularies or preferred drug lists because the drug is most cost effective for consumers or 
because it generates the highest rebate for the PBM.  Pharmacists and physicians charged with 
making decisions about which drugs to include on a formulary are denied access to accurate 
price information.  The absence of accurate price information also makes it difficult for 
consumers to shop for the best value at the pharmacy. 
 
Some experts have argued that price transparency would improve economic efficiency in the 
prescription drug market, empower buyers to negotiate more effectively, give policymakers and 
researchers access to actual price information, and make pharmaceutical firms more accountable 
for the prices they charge (Schondelmeyer).  From this perspective, one result of greater 
transparency might be higher prices for certain purchasers that have achieved large discounts, but 
the overall market price would be more competitive and probably lower.  In particular, cash-
paying customers (typically those without insurance) should gain access to a lower price.  From 
the perspective of drug manufacturers, however, price transparency is not required in other 
market sectors and it would not necessarily reduce overall costs for drugs.  Industry 
representatives maintain that keeping rebate arrangements proprietary allows them to negotiate 
favorable deals with their best customers, whereas making these deals public would hamper 
negotiations. 
 
There has been some recent shift away from keeping rebate payments secret.  According to a 
2003 newsletter article, several PBMs developed business models that reflect the increasing 
demand for transparency.  Under these new arrangements, they typically either pass through to 
the client all money paid by the manufacturer or identify amounts retained by the PBM.  Other 
characteristics of these new products are the identification of rebates received at a drug-specific 
level and the elimination or identification of any other fees paid by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.  Many PBMs are reluctant to adopt these new models because it usually results in 
the elimination of some revenue sources, which in turn leads to higher administrative fees.  
However, those adopting these arrangements find that the savings from increased PBM 
transparency should at the very least offset the higher administrative costs (PBMI). 
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6d.  Lower Dispensing Fees to the Pharmacy 
 
A dispensing fee is a fee paid to the pharmacist in recognition of services provided in connection 
with filling a prescription.  In some pricing methods, the pharmacist is reimbursed separately for 
the cost of the drug itself and for dispensing the drug.  In some cases, the same dispensing fee is 
paid for all prescriptions, but more often a higher dispensing fee is paid for generic drugs than 
for brand-name prescriptions.  This differential provides more incentive for the pharmacy to 
dispense a generic drug when one is available.  Average dispensing fees in 2001 were $2.29 for 
brand-name drugs and $2.58 for generic drugs (AIS; Health Policy Alternatives).  One consultant 
observes that there is a difference between the nominal dispensing fee and the true dispensing 
fee.  If the pharmacy can acquire a drug for less than the reimbursement the PBM or insurer pays 
them for the ingredient cost of the drug, the difference effectively gives them a high dispensing 
fee – or vice versa.  In some contracts, health plans may lower the payment for ingredient costs, 
which will tend to lower the effective dispensing fee – but may result in less competition and 
higher market share for the pharmacies that accept the deal (Fox). 
 
In Medicaid, states are allowed to pay the pharmacist a “reasonable” dispensing fee.  Some states 
set a fixed dispensing fee for all drugs; others set separate fees for brand-name and generic drugs 
or for different types of pharmacies (independent versus chains).  According to a 2003 survey, 
the dispensing fees paid by the states vary widely.  Most are in the range of $3.00 to $5.00 per 
prescription.  But the dispensing fee for a retail pharmacy is as low as $2.00 and as high as $44 
(for dispensing total parenteral nutrition in Minnesota) (Crowley et al.).  States may pay a lower 
dispensing fee to pharmacies where the higher volume results in lower unit costs.  Some states 
have lowered the dispensing fee as a cost savings measure, but this can lead to political 
problems.  For example, Massachusetts in 2002 tried to lower its dispensing fee only to meet 
with a decision by large drug store chains to withdraw from participation in the program.  The 
standoff was eventually settled, so that the chains continued in the program.   
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6e.  Use of Restricted Pharmacy Networks 
 
Plans can lower costs by defining the list of retail pharmacies participating in the plan.  Some 
plans or pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) also argue that they can improve quality with a 
restricted network.  Pharmacy networks can be restricted on an exclusive basis, that is, 
prescriptions will not be paid if obtained out of network.  Or they can be restricted on a preferred 
basis, where out-of-pocket costs for enrollees are higher if non-network pharmacies are used.  
Plans may use restricted pharmacy networks to lower dispensing fees, to get better results from 
efforts such as generic substitution, or to improve quality because of the availability of automatic 
DUR programs. 
 
Pharmacies face mixed incentives in accepting lower reimbursements to be included in the 
network.  Their income per transaction is reduced, but inclusion in the network should offer them 
a higher volume of customers, which increases both revenues for the pharmacy business and foot 
traffic and sales volume in other parts of the store.  In some states, “any willing provider” laws 
may require plans to accept any pharmacy that agrees to the terms in the standard network 
contract.  If most pharmacies join the network, the ability to achieve either large discounts or 
increased sales will be weakened. 
 
According to one survey, the proportion of employers with full network access increased from 
79 percent in 1995 to 89 percent in 2001 (PBMI).  The remaining employers had “limited-
access” pharmacy networks.  While the survey report does not define these terms, it seems clear 
that the distinction is between plans where enrollees can go to any pharmacy and those where 
some pharmacies do not participate in the network.  Networks for the larger PBMs typically 
include about 95 percent of the retail pharmacies across the country (Health Policy Alternatives). 
 
The use of restricted pharmacy networks is often cited by private plans and PBMs as a 
significant source of cost savings, but there is little agreement on the magnitude of such savings.  
Because specific discounted rates are treated as proprietary information, it is difficult to get firm 
numbers on the potential for savings in this area.  In a 2003 study of Medicare+Choice plans, 
plan respondents claimed discounts ranging from 13 to 16 percent for brand-name drugs through 
restricted networks (Draper et al.).  But another report observes (without documentation) that 
savings are in the range of 1.4 percent of overall costs and attributes the rise in unrestricted 
pharmacy networks at least in part to the limited savings.  This report suggests that plan 
members tend to rate unrestricted pharmacy access as important to their satisfaction with the 
plan, creating a disincentive to use this approach (PBMI).  One PBM (Medco) states that plans 
can save up to 4 percent of the usual discounted price by limiting retail pharmacy networks, 
while another (AdvancePCS) places the level of savings at 2 to 10 percent.  Medco advises its 
clients that they can narrow the network of pharmacies by raising the minimum access 
requirement, for example, from one mile to three miles.  Such a change will increase the ability 
of the PBM to negotiate discounts without a significant impact on member satisfaction (Medco). 
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6f.  Use of Discount Cards 
 
Prescription drug discount cards are a relatively recent approach to providing consumers with 
lower-cost outpatient prescription drugs, an approach that has gotten increased attention since the 
establishment of the Medicare-approved drug discount card in the Medicare Modernization Act 
(MMA).  These programs target consumers with little or no prescription drug coverage, such as 
elderly Medicare beneficiaries.  Specific arrangements vary by region, sponsor, and the drugs on 
which the discount will apply.  Drug card sponsors range from pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs), insurance companies, third party administrators, and manufacturers, to nonprofit 
organizations and state governments.  Those who meet specific eligibility criteria must sign up 
for the card and, often times, pay an enrollment fee.  Once receiving the card, beneficiaries can 
receive discounts at specified retail or mail-order pharmacies.   
 
According to the General Accounting Office, PBM-administered cards offer a price that is 10 to 
15 percent below either a standard reference price or the retail pharmacy’s price, depending on 
which is lower.  Manufacturer-sponsored cards usually provide lower drug prices than PBM-
administered cards because they offer either a larger discount off a lower reference price or a flat 
price ($10 or $15) (GAO). 
 
The GAO noted that regional drug price variability was a main factor in overall cost savings.  In 
Washington, D.C., for example, where drug prices are relatively high, cards provided the highest 
median savings.  Median savings after using a PBM-administered card ranged from $2.09 to 
$20.95 for a 30-day supply of the nine drugs the GAO examined, while the card savings in North 
Dakota for these drugs ranged from $0.54 to $7.72. 
 
A 2002 study sponsored by the Kaiser Family Foundation highlighted issues consumers confront 
when shopping for a program that will generate the most cost savings.  These include lack of 
standardization of drug cards’ benefit descriptions, restriction of discounts to specific drugs only, 
use of undisclosed prices from which discounts are derived, inconsistency of prices, and 
availability of mail-order prices only.  In some cases, the discounted price can only be obtained 
from a pharmacy in the program’s network, and the availability of that price varies from store to 
store and over time (Health Policy Alternatives/2002).   
 
According to data compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures as of late 2004, 22 
states had either established or authorized prescription drug discount programs targeted toward 
lower-income people who do not qualify for Medicaid (NCSL).  While some programs extend 
assistance to disabled populations, more than half restrict eligibility to those over the age of 65.  
Cards endorsed by pharmaceutical company or PBMs also provide assistance to similar 
populations.  Available card programs vary considerably, as illustrated by the following list of 
eligibility requirements for several discount cards: 
 
• California and Florida both have discount programs designed to give Medicare beneficiaries 
access to the same low prices available to Medicaid beneficiaries. 
 
• The AARP MemberRx Choice discount card is offered to AARP members for an annual fee 
of $19.95 (after paying an additional AARP membership fee).  Drug discounts vary by 
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prescribed drug.  AARP states that annual savings in the first year of enrollment is 
approximately $189 or about 19 percent. 
 
• TogetherRx is a discount card collaboratively created by several pharmaceutical companies 
such as Abbott Laboratories, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Novartis, and Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical.  
Discounts are extended to those who are enrolled in Medicare with an annual income less 
than $28,000 for singles and $38,000 for couples.  Eligible enrollees must not have any other 
source of prescription drug coverage.  
 
Although the number of discount card programs continues to grow, one report discusses retail 
pharmacists’ discontent with such programs because cost savings may be generated by pharmacy 
concessions on drug prices and dispensing fees.  Participating pharmacies try to compensate for 
lost revenue by increasing prescription volume and sales of other items in their stores.  PBMs 
usually require participating pharmacies to serve all of their clients, including insured groups, 
individuals, and enrollees in discount card programs.  When drug card programs shift business to 
mail-order companies, retail pharmacists lose money from both prescription drug purchases and 
other items purchased at the time of prescription pick-up (Health Policy Alternatives/2002). 
 
Determining exact consumer cost savings is difficult because of the many factors involved, such 
as quantity and type of a prescription needed.  Although card sponsors receive drug rebates, the 
ultimate effect of these rebates is highly variable, as highlighted in the GAO report on discount 
cards (GAO).  
 
The MMA allows Medicare beneficiaries the opportunity to obtain drug discount cards 
beginning in June 2004 through the end of 2005 (until the Medicare Part D drug benefit goes into 
effect in 2006).  The Medicare-approved drug discount cards cost beneficiaries no more than $30 
per year, and qualifying low-income beneficiaries receive annual transitional assistance subsidies 
of $600 on the card.  According to one study, savings on a market basket of drugs ranged from 
17 percent to 24 percent from retail prices at selected Maryland pharmacies (Health Policy 
Alternatives/2004).  Despite the availability of savings (especially for those eligible for the $600 
subsidies), enrollment has been lower than expected, due in large part to confusion by 
beneficiaries who typically must choose among at least 34 cards. 
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6g. Defined Contribution Approaches 
 
In defined contribution or consumer-directed health plans, the employer contributes a fixed 
dollar amount toward health benefits and shifts the responsibility for those dollars to the 
employee.  In addition to making costs more predictable, employers look to decrease 
administrative burdens and increase health care choices while empowering employees to take 
control of their health care spending in order to reduce the employer’s responsibility for plan 
management decisions.  Defined contribution products in the market typically include the 
following features: consumer health spending accounts, a major medical or other kind of 
insurance policy, and reliance on the Internet to support consumer decision making (Christianson 
et al.; Draper and Claxton; Trude). 
 
In the case of drug spending before the deductible is met, the patient usually pays 100 percent of 
the negotiated rate for the prescription, drawing either from their health spending account or out 
of pocket.  Once the deductible is met and the insured benefit commences, the pharmacy benefit 
may become more controlled using standard approaches used by pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs).  The idea is to familiarize patients with the high cost of drugs beyond what can be 
achieved when paying a copay for each prescription and thus to create a greater incentive to seek 
cost-effective alternatives.  In a few cases, certain drugs that are seen as critical to preventing 
hospital stays or other high-cost treatments may be covered by the plan prior to the deductible 
being met. 
 
The pharmacy benefit provided by a defined-contribution product may be integrated with the 
medical deductible or carved out as a stand-alone card program run by a pharmacy benefit 
manager.  When the pharmacy benefit is included with other medical services, a PBM may still 
provide management services, for example, applying clinical edits such as those for adverse drug 
interactions.  Access to a network of discount pharmacies is usually provided, although a patient 
may select any pharmacy he or she chooses (typically at a higher cost).   
 
Cost-savings options, such as using generics, are advised but not required since the consumer 
controls the funds and suffers the consequences of higher spending.  One company claims its 
generic substitution rate is higher than the national average, citing an example of one plan where 
the generic substitution rate (among drugs where a generic equivalent is available) went from 89 
percent to 92 percent (Managed Care Week).  There is also some anecdotal evidence of higher 
mail-order use under these arrangements.  Most companies offering defined contribution or 
consumer-directed products provide a website through which patients can check the cost of the 
drug they have been prescribed and compare the price with that of generic options.  Other cost-
effective brand-name drug alternatives may be suggested, but not required, as there is usually an 
open formulary. 
 
A 2003 newsletter article argued that one of the key components of defined contribution plans is 
to reduce drug utilization.  An expert in PBM marketing and sales stated that the decreased 
utilization prompted by such plans, to a certain extent, worries PBMs.  While some encourage 
the use of generic and lower-cost products, few PBMs have addressed issues confronted by 
decreased utilization to the same extent (Inside Consumer-Directed Care).   
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Humana recently launched a plan that utilizes the defined contribution approach outside of a 
fully implemented defined contribution health plan.  Depending on the drug category, Humana’s 
plan caps the amount it will contribute toward the cost of a prescribed drug, leaving the 
consumer with the remainder of the cost.  The goal of this plan design is to get consumers 
engaged in the process of choosing prescription drugs based on their value.  Plan enrollees can 
choose any prescription drug and Humana will pay one of four different allowances for the drug 
depending on its category.  Whatever costs are not covered by the allowance will fall on the 
consumer.  The four categories of drugs are:  Group A (for which Humana will pay a $40 
allowance): drugs that treat acute illness; Group B ($30 allowance): maintenance drugs such as 
those for high blood pressure, AIDS, and cancer; Group C ($20 allowance): drugs such as allergy 
medications, which patients could live without, but which boost workplace productivity; and 
Group D drugs ($10 allowance): lifestyle drugs such as those for acne or sexual dysfunction.  
Once a member pays $1,500 out of pocket, Humana pays 100 percent of the remaining drug 
costs for the year.  Also, any leftover allowance money goes into the enrollee’s flexible spending 
account, to be used for other needed prescriptions or medical services (Drug Cost Management 
Report). 
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7. Pricing Strategies: Lower Transaction Costs 
 
Some strategies aim at lowering the actual transaction costs for dispensing the drug and thus the 
price paid for the drug.  Mail-order strategies may also facilitate other types of utilization 
management, for example by allowing time to contact the physician and request a revised 
prescription before the drug is dispensed. 
 
a. Incentives for increased use of mail-order pharmacies 
b. Mandatory mail order for maintenance medications 
 
 
  
Page 94
7a.  Incentives for Increased Use of Mail-Order Pharmacies 
 
Most plans include the option of obtaining prescriptions through mail order in addition to 
through retail pharmacies.  For example, 85 percent of the Medicare+Choice plans that offered 
drug benefits in 2003 included a mail-order option (Achman and Gold).  Typically, use of mail 
order is voluntary.  Plans generally offer some financial incentive to use mail order in the form of 
reduced copayments for a 90-day supply of a medication obtained through the mail, often the 
equivalent of the retail copayment for two 30-day supplies.  They may also emphasize the 
convenience factor to plan members.   
 
Use of mail order remains limited.  Average mail-order utilization among private-sector plans, 
measured as the proportion of mail-order prescriptions out of all prescriptions, increased from 13 
percent in 2001 to 16 percent in 2002 (PBMI).  But Medicare+Choice plans estimate that fewer 
than 6 percent of all prescriptions are filled by mail.  Plan officials suggest that this rate of use 
may exceed that of commercial members because Medicare beneficiaries use more maintenance 
drugs (Draper et al.). 
 
Plans or pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) believe that use of mail-order pharmacies (or home 
delivery pharmacies) has the potential to lower costs and improve quality.  They are able to 
obtain larger discounts through greater formulary compliance and to impose more safety 
controls.  One PBM finds that use of home delivery pharmacies can save up to 10 percent of 
retail costs for maintenance drugs dispensed by mail — although this estimate may not capture 
additional savings through easier application of other cost management features (Medco). 
 
One analysis details some of the economics of using mail order.  First, the cost of drugs obtained 
through mail order is lower.  For example, the reimbursement rate for mail-order sales of brand-
name drugs was 79.6 percent of the average wholesale price (AWP), compared to 85.5 percent 
for retail sales.  This is a savings equal to 6 percent of the list price; the difference goes up when 
dispensing fees (higher for retail) are taken into account (PBMI).  Second, generic drugs may be 
dispensed more frequently.  The overall rate of dispensing generic drugs is higher for mail order, 
but this reflects the types of maintenance medications for which patients choose to use mail 
order.  Experts believe that, for the same drugs, mail order leads to more generic substitution. 
 
Several factors are involved in achieving savings through use of mail order.  One factor is the 
efficiency obtained in the mail-order operations, including lower administrative overhead and 
more ability to purchase medications in bulk and repackage them in larger orders (typically 
three-month supplies).  In addition, the time lag of several days inherent in the mail-order 
environment where the patient is not waiting for the prescription to be filled allows more 
effective use of techniques such as generic substitution, therapeutic substitution, formulary 
compliance, and prior authorization.  These can be accomplished because the physician can be 
contacted about revising a prescription during this additional time.  Typically, this means that 
more prescriptions are filled with the PBM’s preferred drug.  In the ideal situation, this drug is 
both more appropriate for the patient and less costly. 
 
Medco, for example, has found that generic substitution programs are more effective in the mail-
order environment.  When a generic version of Prozac first became available, prescriptions filled 
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through mail order were dispensed at a 90 percent generic rate within one week of availability.  
By contrast, retail dispensing of the generic was only about 60 percent at that same point in time, 
rising to about 80 percent after six weeks.  Similarly, when Vasotec went off patent, mail order 
achieved a 90 percent generic dispensing rate after the first month, while retail pharmacies 
dispensed only 50 percent in generic form in the same time and only 60 percent after 3 months 
(Medco). 
 
Use of mail order may have less desirable consequences.  For example, some consultants suggest 
that the mail-order environment reduces the patient’s access to the advice offered by a 
pharmacist.  Some also suggest that there is a drop-off in compliance because the system of 
reminders is less effective.  Finally, others point to the potential safety risks around the physical 
and chemical stability of mailed drugs.   
 
Retail pharmacies often find it difficult to compete with discounts offered by mail-order 
pharmacies.  Recently, Walgreens Health Initiatives, the PBM serving Walgreens retail drug 
stores, allowed members to purchase 90-day supplies of maintenance medications in Walgreens 
retail pharmacies.  While discounts offered by this program decrease the amount customers 
would pay if they purchased only a 30-day supply, it is still more cost effective for persons to 
order 90-day supplies from mail-order programs (Drug Cost Management Report).   
 
Some experts have also raised concerns about whether the promised savings will be achieved 
(Fox, Kreling, Managed Care Week).  One expert points out that at least some of these savings 
could be offset by waste resulting from the larger size prescriptions that are typically filled and 
from the lower copays.  In general, the payer or health plan must determine whether the higher 
plan share of the payment that results from reduced copayments is offset by efficiencies in filling 
the prescriptions or by increased numbers of prescriptions switched to cheaper generic drugs.  
Some purchasers have found that the mail-order benefit actually increases their costs 
(McDonough and Chandor; William M. Mercer Inc.; PBMI).  A recent study presented at the 
2004 meetings of the International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research 
found that the revenue lost from lower copayments charged for mail-order sales might not be 
matched by the reduced cost of ingredients and lower dispensing costs (Carroll).  This study, not 
yet published in a peer-reviewed publication, has been soundly criticized by pharmacy benefit 
managers as not representative of other experience with mail order.  Concerns about the absence 
of savings may lead some plans to increase cost sharing for mail-order prescriptions. 
 
Higher rebates may be one source of savings at mail order, but some suggest that the savings 
obtained through larger rebates do not always benefit the purchaser or patient, since some rebates 
are retained by the PBM.  To some consumers, home delivery by mail may be a substantial 
convenience.  In other situations, the loss of an immediate fill for a prescription can be a 
drawback.  Still, surveys have suggested that those using mail-order prescriptions are satisfied 
with the services they receive (Johnson et al.). 
 
A peer-reviewed study that used 2001 PBM drug claims data to look at the effect of various plan 
design features on drug use and spending for people age 65 and older with private employer-
based coverage found a large variation in the proportion of prescriptions filled by mail (from 
none to more than half).  The generic use rate is lower in mail order than retail, but that finding 
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(consistent with previous studies) may reflect plan members’ decisions of when it is worth using 
mail order.  The study found savings from mail order, both for members (lower copayments) and 
the plan (lower prices), with the savings most apparent for brand-name medications.  The 
average price difference was about 20 percent, and although the enrollee reaped some of that 
savings through the lower copayment, considerable savings were typically available to the plan 
(Thomas et al.). 
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7b.  Mandatory Mail Order for Maintenance Medications 
 
Most plans include the option of obtaining prescriptions through mail order in addition to 
through retail pharmacies.  Most commonly, use of mail order is voluntary, but in some cases, 
plans may mandate that members obtain certain maintenance medications via mail order.  One 
survey in 2002 found that 78 percent of employers were using or implementing use of mail order 
for refills of maintenance drugs on at least a voluntary basis, while 11 percent required its use.  
Another 27 percent of employers said they were considering mandatory use of mail order 
(Hewitt).  Another survey reports that on average 16 percent of prescriptions were dispensed by 
mail order in 2003, up from 13 percent in 2002.  That survey also found that where mail order is 
mandatory for refilling maintenance prescriptions, 27 percent of prescriptions were dispensed in 
that manner compared to 14 percent of prescriptions in a voluntary mail-order plan (PBMI).  
Some observers have suggested that mail-order use rates may be higher for retirees (Fox; Cook 
et al.). 
 
Some plans may use a stick by limiting coverage at the retail pharmacy for the original 
prescription to one refill (or sometimes to three refills) and to require that further refills be 
obtained by mail order.  Other plans use a carrot, for example, by offering a financial incentive to 
use mail order in the form of reduced copayments for a 90-day supply of a medication obtained 
through the mail, often the equivalent of the retail copayment for two 30-day fills.  They may 
also emphasize the convenience factor to plan members.  
 
Estimates of the potential for savings generally fall in the range of between 5 and 10 percent of 
costs for those drugs obtained via mail order (Fox; Medco).  These are estimates based on the 
experience of experts in the field, not on scientific studies (see section 7a or more discussion of 
savings for mail order).  In one example, where retail coverage for a client was limited to three 
refills, Medco reported that mail-order volume increased from nearly 45 percent to nearly 60 
percent of total days dispensed, while the trend in per member per month costs dropped by 16 
percentage points (Medco). 
 
Many benefit managers view mandatory mail order as a strategy that may generate complaints 
from their enrollees.  The experience in one case study suggested, however, that complaints 
subsided after a few months (Drug Cost Management Report).  Mandatory mail order is 
increasingly generating political opposition.  Retail pharmacies often have the clout to force 
action in the legislature, especially where mail-order operations are out of state.  Some states 
have banned provisions for mandatory mail order, while others have limited the ability of plan 
designs to reduce copays for 90-day prescriptions. 
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 8. Regulatory Strategies Available Only to Government: Pricing Approaches 
 
Some regulatory approaches address prices directly in ways that only government as regulator, 
not individual payers, can do.  Section 9 includes other regulatory approaches available to the 
government, focusing on those approaches that do not directly regulate the prices paid by 
different purchasers. 
 
a. Expanded access to Medicaid rebates or changes to the rebate formula 
b. Direct price regulation 
c. Expanded access to the federal supply schedule 
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8a.  Expanded Access to Medicaid Rebates or Changes to the Rebate Formula 
 
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the Congress established a rebate paid by the 
manufacturer to states for drugs purchased under Medicaid.  This had the effect of lowering net 
costs for the state without interfering directly in the transactions between manufacturers (and 
intermediaries such as wholesalers) and pharmacies.  The rebate system imitated a similar rebate 
system that had evolved in private market transactions (section 6b).  States only receive federal 
matching payments for the cost of drugs produced by manufacturers that have entered into rebate 
agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  In return for this rebate 
agreement, states are required to cover all drugs to which such agreements apply.  
 
The amount of the Medicaid rebate is set by statute.  For brand-name drugs, the basic rebate is 
set at a minimum of 15.1 percent or the difference between the average manufacturer price 
(AMP) and the manufacturer’s “best price” for the drug.  Additional rebates apply where the 
AMP for the drug grows more quickly than the consumer price index.  The latter provision was 
designed to eliminate any incentive for manufacturers to offset the rebate with higher prices for 
drugs already on the market.  On average, it is estimated that states save about 20 to 21 percent 
on their drug spending each year as a result of the rebate (CBO; Cook/1999; Cook/2001).  States 
must ensure that rebate payments are collected from the manufacturers, and states can determine 
whether the funds are returned to the Medicaid program or retained for the state’s general fund. 
 
The best price provision is designed to ensure that Medicaid pays no more for drugs than do 
other large private-sector purchasers.  Using a rebate rather just mandating a lower price mimics 
the private sector, where rebates are commonly used as a way of effectively lowering prices to 
different purchasers based on their ability to move market share between similar drugs.  It also 
simplifies the system where purchasers do not buy drugs directly from the manufacturers.  The 
mandatory rebate used by Medicaid provides a lower price without any guarantee that the 
manufacturer’s market share will be higher – although Medicaid’s benefit increases overall sales 
by making it possible for low-income beneficiaries to afford to obtain prescribed drugs 
(Cook/1999). 
 
Through a provision of the law, California operates a supplemental rebate program and receives 
additional amounts in return for not placing drugs on its prior authorization list.  As of 2003, 9 
states (of 43 responding to the KCMU survey), had created supplemental rebate programs, 
usually in conjunction with a preferred drug list or system of prior authorization (Crowley et al.).  
Additional states have enacted supplemental rebates since the completion of that survey. 
 
Maine and Vermont recently obtained Medicaid Section 1115 waivers to make the price 
reductions created by the Medicaid rebate available to certain low-income non-Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  Maine also created a program (Maine Rx) that allows any state resident to enroll 
in a program entitling him or her to obtain drugs at a discounted price.  Under this program, 
which the Supreme Court in 2004 decided not to invalidate, the state will collect rebates from 
participating manufacturers in amounts based on negotiations.  Some other states have taken 
steps to collect rebates, similar to those collected for Medicaid, for other state drug purchases, 
such as for state employee benefit programs or state pharmaceutical assistance programs.   
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Some proposals have been advanced to increase Medicaid’s rebates, either by simply changing 
the percentage of the price difference or some other element used in the formula.  If the rebate 
amount grows, it may influence the best prices available to private purchasers.  There is evidence 
that the best price provision already hampers the ability of some private purchasers to get larger 
discounts.  Similarly, if use of the Medicaid rebate were extended to other populations such as 
Medicare beneficiaries, it would lower the net price paid for their drugs, but would have a 
potential effect on the private market.  Manufacturers might give fewer discounts, thus raising 
private-sector prices.  Such a policy might still be viewed as desirable to some if it created more 
level pricing across purchasers (CBO, Cook/1999). 
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8b.  Direct Price Regulation 
 
Government has the power to set directly the price paid for drugs.  It has chosen, however, not to 
regulate pricing in the private sector.  As a purchaser of drugs under Medicaid and in certain 
other government programs (e.g., the Veterans Administration, community health centers), the 
government does exercise price-setting authority (see section 8c, in addition to the discussion 
here).  In Medicare, the federal government has used some price regulation for the relatively few 
drugs it purchases under Medicare Part B.  But for the Medicare outpatient drug benefit created 
under the Medicare Modernization Act, the federal government has chosen not to exercise its 
regulatory authority.   By contrast, governments in some other nations have chosen to take a 
more active role in regulating prices.  Although a full discussion of price regulation in other 
countries is beyond the scope of this report, this section discusses price regulation briefly. 
 
In Medicaid, federal law places a ceiling on the payment for brand-name drugs.  The ceiling is 
set at either the drug’s estimated acquisition cost (EAC) plus a dispensing fee or the usual and 
customary charge for the drug.  In most cases, states use the average wholesale price (AWP) to 
establish the EAC.  States then set their payment amount as a subtraction from AWP, such as 
AWP minus 10 percent, plus a dispensing fee.  There is a different method used to set the price 
for multisource drugs.  Some states have considered reducing the price, by calling for a greater 
reduction below AWP.  As a separate issue, there is the possibility of using a different 
benchmark than AWP.  AWP is a “price” set by manufacturers, but does not represent amounts 
actually used in sales transactions. 
 
Under Medicare Part B, the government is responsible for establishing prices for certain 
physician-administered drugs.  In recent years, Medicare has paid physicians for these drugs at 
95 percent of the AWP.  The Medicare Modernization Act reduced the payment rates for most 
drugs purchased under Part B, with the goal of moving away from reliance on the AWP, which 
does not reflect the actual acquisition costs incurred by physicians.  The MMA also calls for 
implementation of a system of competitive bidding to obtain these drugs at a lower market-based 
price and thus moves away from direct regulation of these drug prices (section 2g). 
 
Pharmaceutical price regulation plays a substantially greater role in several other nations.  In 
Canada and France, for example, the government negotiates directly with manufacturers to 
determine the payment level for most drugs.  A price is typically established after marketing of a 
drug is approved but before it reaches the market.  The manufacturer’s proposed price is 
reviewed and compared to prices charged in other countries.  In addition, the government must 
approve all price increases.  In Germany (as well as in the Canadian province of British 
Columbia), the primary approach is reference pricing for all drugs for which there is either an 
exact or close substitute on the market (section 3f).  In addition, Germany uses a system of 
budgets whereby physicians are at financial risk for their prescribing behavior.  Finally, in the 
United Kingdom, the primary regulatory approach is the regulation of manufacturer profits.  A 
target rate of return is set for each country on its brand-drug sales to the national health plan.  
Actual prices are not regulated, but any price increases require government authorization (Stuart 
et al.). 
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Some policymakers have proposed to regulate drug prices more generally in the United States, 
for example by limiting annual price increases or by denying certain tax advantages to 
manufacturers that raise prices by amounts greater than inflation.  A peer-reviewed article in 
1995 reviewed literature on price regulation in the public utility industry and found that under 
conditions of rapidly changing demand and a short product life cycle, price caps could be 
manipulated.  Applying that model to the pharmaceutical industry, Abbott found that the wide 
variety of product forms (different packages and dosages) makes drug price regulation difficult.  
The author also simulated the behavior of pharmaceutical firms in reaction to regulation, 
showing that they would set launch prices 50 percent higher than in an unregulated market.  The 
benefit to consumers occurs only after a product has been on the market about seven years, at 
which point the unregulated price would be higher than the regulated price off of a higher launch 
price.  The specifics of this analysis and its underlying model may have limited applicability, but 
it points out the complexity of predicting a response to price regulation (Abbott). 
 
Danzon has written extensively on the impact of price regulation, drawing on cross-national 
experiences.  In a working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research (supported by 
Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals), she and her colleagues looked at the launch of new chemical 
entities in 25 countries (Danzon, Wang, and Wang).  Of the 85 new drugs studied, the countries 
with the most launches in the 1994-99 period were those that did not require price approval 
before launch, including the United States.  Nations with a higher expected price also saw more 
drug launches.  On this basis Danzon and her colleagues concluded that price regulation 
negatively affects the timing and occurrence of the launch of new drugs.  In a 2000 peer-
reviewed article, she looked at drug prices in seven nations, considering whether different 
regulatory approaches affect competition and prices – focusing on both drugs with generic 
competitors and those with potential therapeutic substitutes (Danzon and Chao).  The analysis 
suggests that price competition between generic competitors is more significant in those markets 
that are less regulated – fewer generic products, less price competition between generics, and less 
competitive late entrants to the generic market.  The authors conclude “regulation thus 
undermines the potential for significant savings on off-patent drugs.”  The evidence in this study 
for therapeutic substitutes is inconclusive. 
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8c.  Expanded Access to the Federal Supply Schedule 
 
Prices paid to drug manufacturers by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and certain other 
federal agencies are set by the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS).  Under the Veterans Health Care 
Act of 1992, manufacturers must make drugs available to covered entities at the FSS price as a 
condition for having their drugs covered by Medicaid.  The VA negotiates FSS prices with 
manufacturers under the condition that it be no higher than the lowest contractual price charged 
by the manufacturer to any nonfederal purchaser under similar terms and conditions.  The 
General Accounting Office has calculated that average FSS prices are more than 50 percent 
below average prices to nonfederal purchasers (GAO).  There are other rules that sometimes 
provide lower prices to the VA and Department of Defense compared to certain other purchasers 
with access to the FSS, particularly some public hospitals and community health centers. 
 
There are several reasons why the FSS price is so much lower than the prices charged to other 
purchasers.  One is the small share of the market (less than 2 percent) that federal purchasers 
represent.  Others include the effectiveness of the VA as a price negotiator and the interest that 
manufacturers may have in making sure that their drugs are available to federal facilities and 
agencies, including VA hospitals that train a large number of the nation’s physicians.  The VA 
sometimes negotiates separately for even lower prices by including a drug on its formulary and 
creating strong incentives for prescribing these drugs (DHHS). 
 
Some have advocated providing broader access to FSS prices, such as giving Medicaid or 
Medicare beneficiaries access to these prices.  FSS prices are excluded from the best price 
provision used in Medicaid, a provision that determines the size of rebates manufacturers must 
give the program.  This exclusion was added shortly after the creation of the Medicaid program 
in 1990 after some manufacturers raised their price to the VA in order to reduce their required 
Medicaid rebates.  Veterans’ advocates convinced Congress to add the exclusion and set separate 
pricing rules for federal purchasers. 
 
Although advocates of wider use of FSS prices point to the potential for large savings, others 
contend that manufacturers would no longer agree to the same low prices in their negotiations 
with the VA.  The relatively small market share of the purchasers currently eligible for using 
FSS prices would be expanded substantially under most such proposals.  The Medicaid 
experience in the early 1990s appears to lend support to this argument (Cook).  
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 9.  Regulatory Strategies Available Only to Government: Non-Price Approaches 
 
These regulatory approaches, also available only to government, modify current regulatory 
practices in ways designed to reduce costs broadly across all payers.  This section includes only 
those regulatory approaches that do not directly regulate the price of drugs; section 8 includes 
regulatory approaches that address prices directly. 
 
a. Broader availability of generic drugs through changing patent protection laws 
b. Broader authority to move drugs to over-the counter status 
c. Increased regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising 
d. Reduced restrictions on importation of drugs from other countries 
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9a.  Broader Availability of Generic Drugs Through Changing Patent Protection Laws 
 
In order for pharmaceutical companies to embark on risky research and development ventures, 
they must know that such ventures will have a positive effect on their profit margin.  It is 
difficult to protect intellectual property from utilization by competitors unless a patent protects it.  
Conversely, controlling the cost of drugs can be addressed by dispensing generic drugs that use 
patented research and development.  Although patents are effective for a 20-year period, drug 
companies do not financially benefit from this period in full since the patent period begins at the 
early stages of research and development prior to the drug entering the market.  
 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, or Hatch-Waxman Act, 
was enacted in response to industry concerns about the shortened patent period and consumer 
demand for more affordable prescription drug therapies.  The main provisions of the law include:  
 
• a 5-year extension to drug patent holders, a limit of a two-year extension for drug 
compounds already in clinical trials or under pre-market review by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA); 
 
• market exclusivity that prevents generic manufacturers from using brand 
manufacturers’ data in their Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) for five 
years for new compounds and three years for new uses of existing compounds; 
 
• a standardized and streamlined process for generic drugs to achieve FDA marketing 
approval. 
 
According to pharmaceutical manufacturers, the share of drugs sold by generic drug makers 
since the inception of the Hatch-Waxman bill has increased from 19 percent in 1984 to 47 
percent in 2000.  Every state allows pharmacists to replace virtually all prescribed brand-name 
drugs with their generic substitutes without prior authorization from the prescribing physician.  
Physicians are allowed, however, to indicate that there is not an appropriate generic substitution 
for the specific patient (section 2f).   
 
Since 1984, both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers began engaging in activity that 
adversely affects the availability of cheaper prescription drugs.  Brand-name drug companies 
have found ways to extend the patent period of their profitable drugs, for example, by patent 
variations of a drug about to go off patent (e.g., a time-release formulation), or by delaying 
listing patents in the Orange Book in order to block generic drug companies’ access to patented 
formulas.  
 
The Wall Street Journal highlighted the practices of AstraZeneca, maker of Prilosec, in a series 
of articles on drug pricing.  In preparation for its patent expiration in 2001, AstraZeneca 
prevented generic competition through a series of lawsuits and peripheral patent claims.  In 
addition, the company spent $500 million a year to push consumers from Prilosec to its new 
patented drug, Nexium, which some critics suggest has little therapeutic advantage over Prilosec 
(Harris).  Some brand-name drug manufacturers also create anti-competitive agreements with 
generic manufacturers to delay or eliminate specific generic drugs from entering the market, 
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while generic companies also seek anti-competitive agreements in order to eliminate generic 
competitors to a specific drug (Strongin). 
 
During the next few years, research-based companies will face a number of patent expirations for 
top-selling drugs, as generic manufacturers ready themselves up for rapid market entry.  Between 
2000 and 2005, 150 drugs with $50 billion in sales in 1998 were scheduled to go off patent 
(Lau).  These patent expirations may lead to decreased brand-name sales, since 27 percent of 
2001 drug expenditures in top therapy classes would go to generics in the next five years (Frear; 
Schroeder and Papas).  A report by researchers at the University of Maryland highlights the 
likely scenario that the number of patent expirations will have a tempering effect on the rate of 
increase for prescription drug spending while fueling demand for cheaper drugs.  This supports 
assertions that increased demand for cheaper drugs will lead to increased generic drug 
competition and market entry (Mullins et al.). 
 
In June 2003, the FDA finalized regulations intended to speed the marketing of generic versions 
of drugs whose basic patent has run out.  The regulations limit to one the number of 30-month 
stays that a brand-name drug manufacturer can receive while it claims that the generic would 
infringe on add-on patents that have not expired.  At the same time, the FDA announced that it 
was increasing the staffing of its generic unit by a third in order to facilitate quicker generic drug 
approval (Moskowitz). 
 
Title XI of the Medicare Modernization Act included several provisions aimed at remedying 
some of the issues identified with the Hatch-Waxman legislation (McDermott, Will & Emery).  
Some of these provisions wrote into law the decisions contained in the June 2003 FDA 
regulation.  The law included provisions to:  
 
• Permit only one automatic 30-month stay on each new application for approval of a 
generic drug and otherwise limit some of the legal steps that might be used to delay 
marketing of the generic drug.  
 
• Require that a generic applicant notify the brand-name manufacturer within 20 days 
after the FDA has filed the ANDA containing a patent challenge.  
 
• Clarify that a generic company has a right to seek a declaratory judgment that 
marketing its generic drug would not violate the patent rights of the brand-name drug, 
thus accelerating the generic company's ability to enter the marketplace. 
 
• Modify the trigger for the 180-day marketing exclusivity period available to the first 
generic applicant, including the possibility that multiple companies may qualify for 
180-day exclusivity if they all file applications on the first day of eligibility. 
 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that these changes to the Hatch-Waxman bill would 
increase availability of generic drugs and would lower total drug spending within the United 
States by $7 billion over ten years.  Of that total, estimated savings for existing mandatory 
federal programs would be $750 million (CBO).  
 
  
Page 108
Literature: 
 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Cost Estimate of the Prescription Drug and Medicare Improvement 
Act of 2003 (S.1) and the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003 (H.R. 1), 
July 22, 2003. 
 
Frear, Raulo, “The Future of Generics,” Express Scripts Presentation, 2002. 
 
Harris, Gardiner, “As a Patent Expires, Drug Firm Lines Up Pricey Alternative,” Wall Street Journal, 
Section A, Page 1; Column 1, June 6, 2002. 
 
Lau, Gloria, “Generic Drug Makers Eagerly Await Patent Expirations For Sales Leaders - A New 
Prescription-Drug Benefit for Seniors on Medicare Would Also Boost Industry Prospects,” 
Investor’s Business Daily, April 3, 2000. 
 
McDermott, Will & Emery, “Congress Approves Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 
2003,” Health Law Update 20(7), November 26, 2003. 
 
Moskowitz, Daniel, “Twin Moves Aim to Speed Generics to Market,” Drug Benefit Trends 15(7): 16-18, 
June 2003. 
 
Mullins, Daniel; Francis Palumbo; and Bruce Stuart, “Projections of Drug Approvals, Patent Expirations, 
and Generic Entry From 2000 to 2004,” presentation to the DHHS Conference on Pharmaceutical 
Pricing Practices, Utilization, and Costs, Washington, DC, August 8-9, 2000. 
 
Schroeder Ralph G., and Paul Papas, “Protecting the Balance of Hatch-Waxman: Understanding the 
Industry's New Dynamics for the 21st Century,” Food & Drug Law Journal 56(1): 19-26, 2001. 
 
Strongin, Robin J., “Hatch-Waxman, Generics, and Patents: Balancing Prescription Drug Innovation, 
Competition, and Affordability,” National Health Policy Forum Background Paper, June 2001. 
  
Page 109
9b.  Broader Authority to Move Drugs to Over-the Counter Status  
 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) designates when a drug can be dispensed only with a 
prescription.  In other cases, drugs can be dispensed over-the-counter (OTC) without a 
prescription, provided the FDA concludes that the OTC drug is effective when used without the 
supervision of a health care professional.  In some cases, the FDA may require new clinical trials 
to evaluate evidence on this question.  For some OTC drugs, a prescription may still be required 
for certain dosages or certain clinical indications.  Total spending on OTC drugs was at least $17 
billion in 2002, according to the Consumer Healthcare Products Association.  
 
The criteria that the FDA must use before approving OTC marketing of a drug include whether: 
(1) patients generally can recognize the condition for which the drug is an approved treatment, 
(2) patients can understand the information on the product label in order to use the drug properly, 
(3) the drug is effective when used without supervision by a health professional, and (4) the drug 
is safe when used as instructed (Brass).  More than 700 products available over-the-counter 
today include ingredients that were available only by prescription less than 30 years ago.   
 
Removing the requirement for a prescription can save time for both the patient and the health 
care professional.  It can increase access to effective drugs while decreasing health care costs by 
requiring fewer visits to physicians.  Some studies have shown that use of certain drugs has 
increased dramatically after becoming available over-the-counter; however, evidence on lower 
costs is hard to evaluate because there are many confounding factors.  Some would argue that the 
long-term use of OTC aspirin for preventing cardiac disease demonstrates the potential value of 
having treatments available without a prescription.  In addition, lower overall health costs may 
be accompanied by higher out-of-pocket costs for consumers who lose insurance coverage for 
purchasing drugs that switch to OTC status (section 1b). 
 
The use of OTC drugs can raise questions of safety, the prime consideration in the FDA’s 
decisions.  Without the supervision of a doctor or nurse, some patients may not be able to use 
OTC drugs appropriately for certain health conditions or in high-risk situations.  Patients may 
not diagnose themselves accurately, leading to delayed or suboptimal treatment of serious 
conditions, but evidence to support this idea is lacking.  The availability of OTC drugs can also 
lead to unnecessary use of drugs with potential adverse side effects, and the exclusion of them 
from the drug utilization lists (if no insurance transaction occurs) may cause drug-drug 
interactions to be missed (Brass; Harrington and Shepherd). 
 
Requests to allow OTC sale of some drugs have been rejected.  In 1994, OTC status for oral 
acyclovir, used to treat genital herpes, was rejected on the grounds that its overuse could hasten 
development of viral and accelerated microbial resistance.  Two cholesterol-lowering drugs were 
rejected in 2000 for OTC status because the FDA believed consumers could not use them safely 
and effectively without a physician’s involvement (Harrington and Shepherd). 
 
Health plans may choose not to cover OTC drugs or to cover them in only limited circumstances 
(section 1b).  Recently, the FDA decided to allow several high-volume drugs, including 
loratadine (Claritin) and omeprazole (Prilosec), on a non-prescription basis.  These decisions 
have brought attention to the issue of covering OTC drugs.  The switch of loratadine was unusual 
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because a health plan initiated the request by a petition to the FDA.  Initially the manufacturer 
opposed the petition, raising both legal and clinical issues.  Schering-Plough later dropped its 
objections, in part because Claritin was going off patent and because it decided to push Clarinex, 
a newly approved replacement drug. 
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9c.  Increased Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
 
Over the last two decades, the target audience for prescription drug advertising made a notable 
shift from medical professionals to consumers.  Direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising emerged 
as an effective mechanism used by pharmaceutical manufacturers to promote products that face 
competition with generic substitution, formulary restrictions, and other managed care cost 
containment strategies.   
 
Since its inception in 1985, DTC advertising has succeeded in increasing consumer demand for 
drugs advertised via television, radio, written publications, and, most recently, the Internet.  
About 91 percent of respondents saw or heard an ad for prescription medications in the year 
2000, opposed to 39 percent in 1993 (Frank et al.).  Proponents of DTC advertising assert that 
such campaigns educate consumers about specific drug therapies, in turn prompting them to 
discuss ailments and specific advertised prescriptions with their physicians.  However, some fear 
that since pharmaceutical companies are ultimately looking to DTC advertising to boost demand 
and increase profits, they are not a reliable source for educational tools on which consumers 
should rely (Hollon).     
 
DTC advertising does have a marked effect on consumer demand.  According to IMS Health 
data, approximately 43 percent of surveyed physicians reported seeing an increased number of 
requests for brand-name drugs, the most common (in 2001) being Claritin, Viagra, Celebrex, 
Vioxx, and Allegra.  IMS Health data also showed that almost 90 percent of consumers learn 
about brand-name drugs through manufacturer ads (IMS Health).   
 
In responses to a survey in 2001-02, physicians reported mixed feelings of the impact of DTC 
advertising.  More than 70 percent agreed that the ads helped educate patients about available 
treatments, and nearly as many agreed that ads helped them have better discussions with their 
patients.  But about 80 percent thought the ads do not provide balanced information and 
encourage patients to seek treatments they do not need.  Physicians reported prescribing the 
advertised drugs in about 40 percent of the visits that were generated by the ads, but they also 
recommended that their patients make lifestyle changes and consider other treatments.  Nearly 
half the time, the physicians thought that the advertised drug was the most effective one 
available, but in another half of the cases they prescribed the advertised drug even though others 
might be as effective.  In about 5 percent of the situations, they prescribed the advertised drug to 
accommodate the patient’s request, despite thinking that another drug or treatment option would 
be more effective (Weissman et al.). 
 
The impact of DTC advertising on sales is modest overall, but dramatic on some of the most 
highly advertised drugs.  According to one analysis, DTC advertising was responsible for about 
12 percent of the overall growth in drug spending between 1999 and 2000 (Rosenthal et 
al./2003).  But DTC advertising is focused primarily on certain drugs.  By one estimate, the 25 
products with the most DTC advertising have the highest growth trend at 42 percent, while other 
drugs that have DTC advertising grew at 16 percent.  Drugs not advertised directly to the 
consumer grew at 10 percent.  Because of the strong correlation between DTC advertising and 
increased product growth, annual spending on DTC advertising for prescription drugs tripled 
between 1996 and 2000, when it reached nearly $2.5 billion (Rosenthal et al./2002).  According 
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to a news report, Nexium (a drug newly introduced in 2001 to treat gastroesophageal reflux 
disease) saw its sales soar by 275 percent in 2002 as a result of heavy DTC advertising (Vaczek).  
 
With increased prescription drug demand comes increased demand for other medical services 
such as physician visits and laboratory tests (Wilkes).  A report by IMS Health found that after a 
year of the DTC campaign for Fosamax, physician visits for osteoporosis evaluation nearly 
doubled.  With increased funds going toward DTC advertising, it can be inferred that increases in 
health system utilization will continue.  While initially this may be expensive, further utilization 
of health services may lead to increased preventive care and early diagnosis of disease.  In the 
long run, this may save the health system money in treatments of advanced diseases.   
 
A potential issue with increased DTC advertising and health system utilization is how well 
doctors can meet increased consumer demand for new prescription drugs.  Doctors’ training in 
pharmacology in relation to increased consumer demand and escalated drug development is 
questionable.  Although the number of people reliant on prescriptions therapies has increased 
over time, education has arguably not kept pace with such expansion (Hunt).  There is also 
concern that DTC advertising may mislead both consumers and health care providers.  Some ads 
seem to make consumers think a drug therapy is more effective than it actually is.  Incomplete or 
skewed information about a drug potentially misguides both consumers and providers into 
deducing false information about a new product. 
 
Overall, the General Accounting Office found in a 2002 study that oversight of DTC advertising 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is effective at stopping the dissemination of 
misleading advertisements (GAO).  However, some believe that recent changes in FDA’s 
procedures for reviewing draft regulatory letters have reduced the agency’s ability to enforce 
compliance with its regulations.  While DTC advertising is here to stay, its potential negative 
effects may be curbed by increased regulation that may ultimately save consumers and medical 
providers time and money currently spent after exposure to misleading or inappropriate DTC 
advertisements. 
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9d.  Reduced Restrictions on Importation of Drugs from Other Countries 
 
Federal law restricts the importation of drugs from other countries to the United States, even in 
cases of reimportation, where the drug was originally manufactured in the United States.  In 
practice, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not recommend enforcement of this law 
in cases of importation of small quantities of drugs for personal use (FDA).  Because of the 
lower prices of drugs in Canada and Mexico, people have increasingly exploited this loophole.  
According to a 2003 survey, 7 percent of Americans (up from 5 percent a year earlier) said they 
had purchased drugs from Canada (Harris).  More generally, there has been considerable interest 
in broader access to the cheaper drugs in these countries.   
 
The actual price difference between drugs purchased in Canada versus the United States is 
difficult to measure.  Price comparisons are complicated by variations in the prices paid by 
different purchasers (especially in the United States) and by whether prices are compared at the 
manufacturer, wholesale, or retail level.  A 2003 compilation of several studies showed that retail 
prices in Canada were anywhere from 30 percent to 72 percent lower, with even more variation 
in studies of manufacturer prices (Gross). 
 
Congress has twice in recent years enacted laws that would relax the limitations on importation.  
In each case, however, the Secretary was given the discretion not to implement the law if she or 
he could not attest to the guaranteed safety of imported drugs.  Both Secretary Shalala and 
Secretary Thompson invoked their right not to implement this law.  The Medicare Modernization 
Act also loosened importation restrictions for pharmacists and wholesalers for less expensive 
prescription drugs imported strictly from Canada.  However, HHS certification of safety and cost 
savings was again required, and an HHS task force reported in December 2004 that there were 
continued safety issues.  In looking at a different House bill that would not have required 
certification, the Congressional Budget Office projected potential savings to the federal budget 
of $4.5 billion over ten years (without taking into account passage of the new Medicare drug 
benefit) and total savings for all payers of $40.4 billion over ten years (CBO). 
 
Several states and localities have created programs to take advantage of the lower prices in 
Canada.  In 2003, for example, Minnesota established a website for state residents who want to 
buy drugs from approved Canadian pharmacies at prices negotiated by the state.  In addition, the 
city of Springfield, Massachusetts, created a program in July 2003 where city employees and 
retirees can fax prescriptions to Ontario pharmacies and receive medications by mail.  The long-
term fate of these programs in the light of continued objections from the Department of Health 
and Human Services is uncertain. 
 
Reducing the restrictions on importation as a cost containment mechanism is extremely 
controversial.  Proponents highlight substantial consumer cost savings as the main argument for 
its implementation.  A study by the Fraser Institute, an independent Canadian economic and 
social research and educational organization, discussed prescription drug prices for highly 
utilized brand-name drugs in Canada and the United States.  While showing that regional price 
variation in both countries affects potential consumer cost savings, the report asserted that U.S. 
consumers do save money purchasing their drugs in Canada (Graham and Tabler).  According to 
a 2003 poll by the Kaiser Family Foundation, there is strong public support (68 percent) for 
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legislation that loosens restrictions on importation of prescription drugs from Canada.  When 
given arguments for and against such legislation, 63 percent of the public continued to express 
support (Kaiser Family Foundation). 
 
Opponents have viewed legislation to ease importation of prescription drugs as a distraction from 
the larger issue of insufficient drug coverage for those populations who need it most.  Industry 
groups such as PhRMA and the American Pharmacists Association have aligned with assertions 
of the FDA that the safety of imported drugs cannot be guaranteed (Gans).  In addition, some 
pharmaceutical companies have reduced the amount of pharmaceutical supplies to certain 
Canadian pharmacies in order to curb importation of their drugs.  Some also raise the concern of 
whether the FDA can balance a dramatically increased role in prescription drug monitoring in 
conjunction with all of its other responsibilities. 
 
Another issue raised is questionable product packaging.  The FDA oversees the labeling of 
prescription drugs to allow for maximum drug effectiveness with minimum side effects.  This 
raises further concerns that imported drugs may not have such labeling, thus leading to the 
misuse of a prescribed drug.  On numerous occasions, the FDA has indicated that many imported 
mail-order drugs stopped at U.S. borders were potentially dangerous.  They include drugs that 
have been withdrawn from the U.S. market, animal drugs never approved for human use, 
counterfeit drugs, drugs with dangerous interactions, drugs with dangerous side effects, and 
narcotics. 
 
The FDA is also beginning to crack down on mail-order and Internet pharmacies that mislead 
customers about the safety of their drugs.  In 2000, the GAO identified 190 Internet pharmacies 
selling prescription drugs directly to consumers, including 25 that did not require a prescription 
(GAO).  This generates fears that an increasing number of patients are purchasing prescriptions 
online or through the mail without a medical diagnosis or a doctor’s prescription.  To confound 
this situation, many of these pharmacies do not disclose drug safety and approval information on 
their sites, so drug safety and efficacy are questionable.  Proposals such as those in Minnesota 
and Springfield, MA, would try to avoid these problems by establishing working relationships 
with certain pharmacies in Canada.  
 
It has yet to be determined whether importing prescription drugs into the United States would 
have a long-term impact on costs incurred by the consumer, primarily because the factors that 
determine drug prices are varied and interconnected.  Although many prescription drugs cost less 
in Canada than in the United States, the overall amount that could be saved in the long run is 
uncertain.  The lack of consensus on overall cost savings from importation stems from key 
differences in how studies compare drug prices between countries.  Some focus on retail prices 
while others may look at prices charged by manufacturers (Gross).  To further confound 
calculations of long-run savings, the Canadian government is hearing reports of medication 
shortages and drug price increases.  This is attributed mainly to the rise of Internet pharmacies, 
but some feel that the increasing cross-border trade has potential to dismantle Canada’s price-
setting regulatory agency (Voelker).  A 2004 issue brief published by the Congressional Budget 
Office concluded that current legislative proposals to legalize drug importation would yield only 
a small reduction in costs (CBO). 
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 Appendix A.  Literature Reviewed 
 
A wide-ranging review of literature was completed between mid-2002 and late 2004 by the 
author with the help of two research assistants.  Included in this literature search were peer-
reviewed journals, studies published by foundations and government agencies, as well as both 
industry newsletters and mass-circulation newspapers.  This appendix provides additional detail 
on the search strategies. 
 
Full searches were completed for the years 1993 to 2004 for the following peer-reviewed 
journals:  Journal of the American Medical Association, New England Journal of Medicine, 
Health Affairs, Health Services Research, Inquiry, Journal of Health Economics, Milbank 
Quarterly, and the Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law.  Other journals and newsletters 
were checked on a less systematic basis, including Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy, Medical 
Care, and the American Journal of Managed Care.  
 
A systematic search was also made of studies published by foundations and government 
agencies.  While these studies are not part of the peer-reviewed journal literature, they normally 
received extensive review by the organizations involved.  Foundation-sponsored reports included 
those supported by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, the Commonwealth Fund, the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, and the California HealthCare Foundation.  Government studies 
include those by federal agencies, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Research 
Service, and the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission.  State government sources were also 
consulted, including studies published by the National Governors Association and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures. 
 
In addition, various industry sources were reviewed, including work presented by pharmacy 
benefit managers (PBMs), pharmaceutical manufacturers, and insurers.  In particular, this project 
searched for studies published by the larger national PBMs (AdvancePCS, Caremark, Express 
Scripts, and Medco Health Solutions), the National Pharmaceutical Council, Academy of 
Managed Care Pharmacy, the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, and the Pharmacy 
Benefit Management Institute.  Studies by other trade associations or interest groups, such as the 
American Association of Health Plans (now known as America’s Health Insurance Plans) and 
the AARP.  Generally, evidence about the use or effectiveness of cost-containment strategies 
identified through these sources is distinguished in the text of the report from findings reported 
in either peer-reviewed journals or the reports of foundations or government agencies.  The 
reader can judge whether or not to discount findings from these interested organizations. 
 
Finally, articles were used from both trade press (e.g., Drug Benefit Trends, Drug Cost 
Management Report, and Managed Care Week), and mass-circulation newspapers or news 
services (e.g., Associated Press, CNN, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post).  
Most often, these sources provided descriptive information about specific strategies being used 
by an organization – but not an evaluation of its effectiveness. 
 
The search strategy included various library databases, such as Medline, Pubmed, PAIS 
International, LexisNexis Academic, MDConsult, and JAKE.  It also included identification of 
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articles cited in such Internet digests such as the Kaiser Health Policy Daily Report, Medscape 
Week in Review, Business News of the Week, Government News of the Week, and Benefit 
News.  Where formal search strategies were appropriate, searches used the following key word 
search terms: prescription drugs, caps, utilization review, prior authorization, preferred drugs, 
copayments, coinsurance, reference pricing, formulary, cost containment, disease management, 
generics, generic drugs, purchasing pools, pharmacy networks, discount cards, pharmacy, mail-
order pharmacy, rebates, AWP, Hatch-Waxman, over-the-counter, DTC (direct-to-consumer) 
advertising, reimportation, and pharmaceuticals. 
 
Evidence for Cost-Effectiveness 
 
The evidence relating to cost-effectiveness of many approaches is limited.  There have not been a 
large number of peer-reviewed studies on the impact of different cost-containment strategies.  A 
few key approaches, such as tiered cost sharing, have been the subject of numerous studies, but 
many other strategies have not been studied extensively.  In some cases, evidence of 
effectiveness has been reported – often in quite general terms – in various industry newsletters or 
in reports produced by different industry organizations (e.g., the large pharmacy benefit 
managers).  These sources typically do not report peer-reviewed studies, and in most cases lack 
details. 
 
In the write-ups for the different strategies, we label carefully the source of the available 
evidence.  Although peer-reviewed studies are clearly preferable, decision-makers can make 
cautious use of other evidence.  Readers may draw their own conclusions about how much 
weight to give to the non-peer-reviewed evidence.   
 
Other limitations relating to the discussion of effectiveness include the many different ways that 
evidence has been presented.  Some studies report on the overall impact of a particular strategy 
on annual drug cost trends (percentage savings).  Other studies report on the dollar savings for a 
strategy – sometimes in the aggregate and sometimes on a per-person basis.  Still others report 
results in terms of a percentage of spending for a particular category of drug use.  No attempt has 
been made to standardize these different findings, since the necessary information to do so is 
often unavailable. 
 
Furthermore, the complete context of a particular estimate may not always be available.  Ideally, 
we should have information about characteristics of the population being studied, prior 
utilization patterns, other cost-containment measures that might be in use, and the time frame.  
Typically, some of this information is available; but rarely is all such information available.  We 
have attempted to include all relevant information available in the source consulted. 
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